Many in Washington, like Sen. Marco Rubio, who has urged the Trump Administration to publicly support Mr. Guaidó, are hopeful that the groundswell of support across the international community for Maduro’s political opponents will lead to Maduro’s removal from power by forces inside Venezuela. This would be the best outcome.
For others, the role of the Reagan Administration in removing Ferdinand Marcos from power in the Philippines is a useful precedent. The problem with this approach is that the Trump Administration risks getting caught in the unsavory trap of backing regime change via an internal coup d'etat cloaked in the legitimacy of the National Assembly, designed to confirm Washington’s preference regarding who enjoys the support of the Venezuelan People and who precisely should rule in Caracas.
But if Maduro is not removed by forces within the country; if Maduro can employ what Lenin famously called the “organs of power”—the Venezuelan military and police—to crush his opponents and preserve his control over the country, then what?
Would it then be wise for President Trump to commit U.S. military power to do the job? The temptation to intervene militarily in Venezuela is real, but if the President measures what the United States might gain by what it might lose, the answer is “no.”
The advocates for action will argue that in any conflict with Venezuela, the power of the U.S. military would be overwhelming, promising a quick victory. Maduro’s enemies in the region—particularly in Columbia and Brazil—would certainly welcome his forcible removal from power.
Having failed in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Syria to reaffirm the old formula that equates the “Liberal World Order with American National Security,” Washington’s bipartisan War Party will see Venezuela as an opportunity to recoup its losses and keep the taxpayer gravy train running at full steam.
Moreover, Vladimir Putin’s decision to invest $1 billion in Venezuela’s state-owned oil firm, Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) and land two antiquated Cold War bombers on one of Venezuela’s offshore islands simply buttresses their argument for U.S. military action to prove that the Trump administration is not the collective instrument of Russian influence.
Unfortunately, dispelling the persistent mischaracterization of the ease with which superior military power can be used is not enough. The contrast between the limited aims of the Bush Administration in March 2003—Saddam Hussein’s removal—with the war aims the Bush Administration ultimately embraced—nation building through military occupation—should not be forgotten. Clarity of strategic purpose at the beginning of hostilities, like the military plan of operations, often vanishes with the first shot in anger.
An intervention in Venezuela would open a veritable Pandora’s box of potentially self-defeating outcomes.
All forces in Venezuela may not accept defeat. Many could melt into the Amazonian interior drawing support from allies inside and outside the region to carry on the fight. Maduro’s redistribution of national wealth to his loyalists created patronage networks that will resist their disenfranchisement.
Expectations of Washington’s limitless charity could turn into widespread disappointment when economic conditions over which Washington has little control do not rapidly change for the better. The Latin American States that currently support Washington’s position may find it convenient to join Washington’s opponents in their condemnation of American military action. The historical parallel with Cuba is far from exact, but it’s still instructive.
The U.S. Armed Forces intervened three times in Cuba. After the Spanish-American War, U.S. occupation forces drafted a constitution for Cuba, supervised elections and installed a new government under a President that Washington favored.
When a rebellion erupted between 1906 and 1909 against Washington’s client, the U.S. military returned to occupy Cuba for a second time. In 1912, another uprising against the new Cuban government prompted Washington to send 500 Marines, but this time the Americans stood aside while the government successfully suppressed the rebellion. Is Cuba’s persistent hostility to the United States really a mystery?
If military action is to be regarded as a rational, as well as, a moral activity, then, Americans should applaud Maduro’s removal if the Venezuelan people can achieve that outcome, but, if they cannot, President Trump should resist the temptation to act for them.
The United States can no more transform Venezuela into a stable, liberal Democracy than it could transform Iraq. As we learned in Cuba during the 20th Century and in Iraq during the 21st, what nations do not create for themselves does not survive the withdrawal of American military power.
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/01/26/american_military_power_should_not_decide_venezuelas_future_114139.html
Colonel Douglas Macgregor (U.S. Army, Ret.) is a decorated combat veteran, a Ph.D. and the author of five books. His latest is Margin of Victory, (Naval Institute Press, 2016).
The advocates for action will argue that in any conflict with Venezuela, the power of the U.S. military would be overwhelming, promising a quick victory. Maduro’s enemies in the region—particularly in Columbia and Brazil—would certainly welcome his forcible removal from power.
Having failed in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Syria to reaffirm the old formula that equates the “Liberal World Order with American National Security,” Washington’s bipartisan War Party will see Venezuela as an opportunity to recoup its losses and keep the taxpayer gravy train running at full steam.
Moreover, Vladimir Putin’s decision to invest $1 billion in Venezuela’s state-owned oil firm, Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) and land two antiquated Cold War bombers on one of Venezuela’s offshore islands simply buttresses their argument for U.S. military action to prove that the Trump administration is not the collective instrument of Russian influence.
Unfortunately, dispelling the persistent mischaracterization of the ease with which superior military power can be used is not enough. The contrast between the limited aims of the Bush Administration in March 2003—Saddam Hussein’s removal—with the war aims the Bush Administration ultimately embraced—nation building through military occupation—should not be forgotten. Clarity of strategic purpose at the beginning of hostilities, like the military plan of operations, often vanishes with the first shot in anger.
An intervention in Venezuela would open a veritable Pandora’s box of potentially self-defeating outcomes.
All forces in Venezuela may not accept defeat. Many could melt into the Amazonian interior drawing support from allies inside and outside the region to carry on the fight. Maduro’s redistribution of national wealth to his loyalists created patronage networks that will resist their disenfranchisement.
Expectations of Washington’s limitless charity could turn into widespread disappointment when economic conditions over which Washington has little control do not rapidly change for the better. The Latin American States that currently support Washington’s position may find it convenient to join Washington’s opponents in their condemnation of American military action. The historical parallel with Cuba is far from exact, but it’s still instructive.
The U.S. Armed Forces intervened three times in Cuba. After the Spanish-American War, U.S. occupation forces drafted a constitution for Cuba, supervised elections and installed a new government under a President that Washington favored.
When a rebellion erupted between 1906 and 1909 against Washington’s client, the U.S. military returned to occupy Cuba for a second time. In 1912, another uprising against the new Cuban government prompted Washington to send 500 Marines, but this time the Americans stood aside while the government successfully suppressed the rebellion. Is Cuba’s persistent hostility to the United States really a mystery?
If military action is to be regarded as a rational, as well as, a moral activity, then, Americans should applaud Maduro’s removal if the Venezuelan people can achieve that outcome, but, if they cannot, President Trump should resist the temptation to act for them.
The United States can no more transform Venezuela into a stable, liberal Democracy than it could transform Iraq. As we learned in Cuba during the 20th Century and in Iraq during the 21st, what nations do not create for themselves does not survive the withdrawal of American military power.
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/01/26/american_military_power_should_not_decide_venezuelas_future_114139.html
Colonel Douglas Macgregor (U.S. Army, Ret.) is a decorated combat veteran, a Ph.D. and the author of five books. His latest is Margin of Victory, (Naval Institute Press, 2016).
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