Saturday, March 26, 2016

Russia's drawdown and the prospects for peace in Syria


http://wjla.com/news/capital-insider/russias-drawdown-and-the-prospects-for-peace-in-syria




FILE - In this file photo taken on
Thursday, Oct. 22, 2015, Russian air force pilots assisted by ground
crew climb into their fighter jet at Hemeimeem airbase, Syria. (AP
Photo/Vladimir Isachenkov, File)


 Russia's defense ministry says its first group of warplanes in Syriaare headed home -- one day after a surprise announcement by Russian President Vladimir Putin that he will pull back most Russian forces aspeace talks resume in Geneva.

Col. Douglas Macgregor (ret.), executive vice president of the Burke-Macgregor Group, discussed the issue with Capital Insider.

PDF Presentation

Presentation at the Air Force Academy Symposium on Character and Leadership (25 and 26 FEB 2016).


 

Tuesday, March 1, 2016

Does the Army need airborne?

ARMY TIMES

THE ARMY IS FULLY INVESTED, BUT SOME SAY THE TACTIC IS IMPRACTICAL, COSTLY AND DISCONNECTED FROM MODERN WAR.




By Kyle Jahner

ZARAGOZA, Spain — About 1,200 soldiers from 13 countries looked up toward the thin white clouds stretching across the sky. Having just participated in a brief NATO battle demo, they awaited the November event’s finale.

First Lt. Tim Pena would later say it was “a beautiful day to jump.” But he hadn’t quite arrived just yet.

Right on time, three C-17s cleared the hills to the north, about 1,000 feet above the ground. They flew over the fictional village of “Casas Altas” — an assembly of concrete buildings where the brief staged battle had occurred. A few seconds later, soldiers who nine hours earlier had taken off from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, began to pour from each of the two rearward doors, in standard one-second intervals. Over 500 U.S. paratroopers from 2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division floated to the rocky ground below — it was a beautiful sight.

The jump capped an event, designed largely for the international press, to wrap up NATO’s broader, 36,000-troop, 30-plus-country exercise known as Trident Juncture. NATO described the demonstration as a message to Russia, though Russia declined an invite.

Nevertheless, NATO and U.S. leaders were pleased. The airborne jump may have been the most visually stunning and logistically impressive element of Trident Juncture: hundreds of soldiers in the U.S. travel across the ocean and reach foreign land — on time, without an airstrip, and armed with M4s.

“It’s a great opportunity for us to show what we can do on the Global Response Force,” said Col. Joseph Ryan, the 2nd Brigade commander who jumped along with his soldiers.

The GRF, generally a rotating brigade in the 82nd Airborne Division, is the nation’s quick reaction force designed to rapidly deploy in an emergency. As the Spain exercise demonstrated, Army regards large-scale combat jumps as a crucial capability of the GRF.

But some consider this tactic to be impractical, disconnected from modern war and an unnecessary expense, if not a virtual suicide mission in a real war. Mass combat jumps have been rare since their introduction in World War II, and rarer still in the last 20 years.

“(The) current composition of the United States airborne forces appears more a product of the airborne community’s lobbying efforts in favor of their own size and autonomy than cold calculations about national interests or military requirements,” writes military scholar Marc DeVore in his 2015 Army study “When Failure Thrives.”

DeVore’s study, the first product of the new Army Press, sent shockwaves through the airborne community. In 90 or so pages, DeVore argues that airborne still exists today not because of successful operations, but rather institutionalization and military culture. Even from the start airborne operations produced inconsistent results, and he said in recent decades technology advances have all but removed them from the modern battlefield, both American conflicts and beyond.

"We’ve gone 38 years with it being tough to say any given airborne operation was necessary to accomplish the overall objective of a given operation," DeVore told Army Times.

DeVore is not alone. Retired Col. Doug Macgregor has emerged as a vocal Army critic since retiring in 2004. The former 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry commander holds a PhD in international relations and calls large-scale airborne operations an “anachronism, a thing of the past” and compared it with horse cavalry use in World War II.

Top Pentagon leaders don’t buy it. They acknowledge a major airborne combat operation is a low-probability option, but say a sizable airborne assault remains a vital capability and deterrent.

“The whole new Army operating concept is we’re back to our expeditionary concept ... the beauty of airborne forces is they were always designed to be expeditionary,” said Lt. Gen. Joe Anderson, the Army's deputy chief of staff for operations and a former XVIII Airborne Corps commander. “Typically, an enemy is not going to want to give you free access to a runway, they’re going to damage it. So how else are you going to get in there and get that stuff capable if you don’t have some light expeditionary package that is able to get in there, doesn’t need a lot of supplies?”

“It’s not an Army requirement … It’s a national security requirement,” Lt. Gen. Stephen Townsend, commander of XVIII Airborne Corps, said of robust and rapid forced-entry capacity. “This is the Army’s highest levels saying this capability is something the country needs.”

Many of the Army’s top leaders have earned their jump wings:  Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Milley, Vice Chief Gen. Daniel Allyn, U.S. Special Operations Command chief Gen. Joseph Votel and acting Army secretary Patrick Murphy. Nine of the Army’s 13 four-star generals have led or served in the 82nd or XVIII Airborne Corps.

Airborne also offers training, morale, retention and recruitment perks, according to leaders. Many airborne soldiers absolutely love what they do, despite — or sometimes because of — its inherent risks.

As many generals have noted, you can’t plan for every war and the U.S. has consistently failed to predict where the next war would be fought, or what specific skills would emerge as indispensable. No one suggests jumping out of planes in general to be obsolete; Special Forces and the 75th Ranger Regiment frequently jump into enemy territory.

But does the Army need four-plus brigades — from combat troops to cooks to public affairs officers — training for low-altitude, low-speed static line jumps with ever-tightening budget restraints? (Anderson said airborne brigades costs about 10 percent more in maintenance than standard light infantry, but still roughly a third as much as an armored unit.) And given a paucity of use that spans wars and decades, what is that tactic’s true place in a modern battlefield?

Low probability...but high consequence?

In mid-August, the Army celebrated 75 years of airborne. It was on Aug. 16, 1940, when the 29th Infantry Regiment conducted its first jump at Fort Benning, Georgia. Since that day, the mission task remains simple: get soldiers and equipment safely from a speeding plane to the ground.

Over the last 15 years, the members of the 82nd have seen more than their fair share of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan — but the vast majority have never sniffed a combat jump. In fact, few large jumps into hostile territory have launched since World War II.

The Army planned to downsize the airborne 4th Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division in Alaska into a battalion task force by 2017. Milley told Congress in February, however, he wants to push back that move at least a year. If made, that cut would bring five airborne brigades down to 4 and 1/3 (three in the 82nd Airborne Division plus the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Europe).

While leaders defend limiting airborne cuts to its share of Army-wide force reduction, others suggest slashing further.

MacGregor does not see significant tactical need for a mass combat jump of infantry forces. He says even basic air defense renders an airborne attack suicidal.

_______

CORRECTION:  Colonel Macgregor was misquoted in the article as saying "heavy" armor.  He actually advocates medium-weight armor that is air-deployable and well-armored against the threat with active protection systems...etc.

Monday, February 29, 2016

AFA NCLS.

AFA cadets Taylor, Foss and Rehwaldt with Colonel (ret) Doug Macgregor during his participation in the AFA NCLS.

Thursday, February 25, 2016

GOP candidates’ charges that Obama weakened the military are simplistic, analysts say



Read more here: http://www.kansas.com/news/nation-world/national/article62339152.html#storylink=cpy

Read more here: http://www.kansas.com/news/nation-world/national/article62339152.html#storylink=cpy

Sunday, February 21, 2016

Will Germany Supply 450 Armored Troop Carriers to Australia?


A German defense contractor will offer the Puma armored infantry fighting vehicle to the Australian Army.


Image Credit: PSM 



The German defense contractor Rheinmetall will offer its Puma armored infantry fighting vehicle, co-developed with Krauss-Maffei Wegmann, to the Australian Army under a A$10 (US$7.1) billion tender for 450 armored personnel carriers.

The Australian Army intends to replace its aging fleet of Australian Light Armored Vehicles (ASLAV) and the M113AS4 Armored Personnel Carrier with “a tracked and turreted IFV [infantry fighting vehicle] with protection levels similar to that of the Abrams tank while carrying an eight person section,” according to the Land 400 Phase 3 Mounted Close Combat Capability Request for Information (RFI), released by the Australian Department of Defense. (The RFI deadline is February 22.)

The Department of Defense called the Land 400 program one of its “most significant capability programs” designed to enhance “the mounted close combat capability of the Land Force.” According to the Australian Army’s website, “LAND 400 will deliver a Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle (CRV), an Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV), a Maneuver Support Vehicle (MSV) and an Integrated Training System (ITS).”

The highest priority for the Army is to replace the ASLAV with a new CRV given that the former will need to be retired by 2020, otherwise a capability gap would ensue. The M113s can remain in service until 2030, although it “is not expected to be deployable for anything other than low intensity/low risk missions beyond 2025.” The Australian Army plans to acquire 225 CRVs and about 450 IFVs and MSVs.

The Puma is one of the world’s most advanced and newest IFVs. Developed by Projekt Systems and Management (PSM) consortium, a joint venture of Rheinmetall and Krauss-Maffei Wegmann, the IFV entered service with the German military in June, 2015.

Displacing a mere 31.5 tons, the Puma IFV is a medium-weight armored vehicle and can be quickly airlifted into a deployment  zone. With its two-level armor protection concept— composite armor with optionally add-on armor elements that can be taken off during air transport—it is specifically designed for expeditionary warfare.

According to the PSM website, the IFV “offers high level of off-road maneuverability” comparable with the Leopard 2 main battle tank and can reach a top speed of 70 kilometers (43 miles) on the road.

The IFV is armed with a fully stabilized, automatic 30 millimeter MK30-2 ABM (Air Burst Munitions) autocannon with an effective range of 3,000 meters fitted to the remote-controlled turret. It also sports a coaxially mounted 5.56 millimeter HK MG4 machine gun as secondary weapon.

In addition, the IFV is equipped with the turret-mounted Missile Weapon System SPIKE, a missile launcher with two missiles allowing “the Puma to fight enemy targets as well as helicopters and threats behind enemy lines even more effectively,” according to the PSM website. The SPIKE missile launcher has an effective range of 4,000 meters.

An additional interesting feature of the Puma is its full-length crew compartment for the entire crew, including driver, gunner and commander as well as an infantry squad consisting of six soldiers. “This concept minimizes the volume to be protected, thus the crew protection can be maximized within the existing weight constraint,”  PMS explains.

Competition for the Land 400 program of the Australian Army will be fierce. “General Dynamics and Lockheed Martin Corp. are expected to team up to offer a vehicle developed for the British Army, while BAE’s Australian arm will offer the CV90, used by a number of European countries,” the website Army Recognition reports.  In 2013, Rheinmetall won a $1.5 billion contract  to supply 2,500 trucks to the Australian Defense Force.

http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/will-germany-supply-450-armored-troop-carriers-to-australia/

Sunday, February 14, 2016

War Makes Victorious Armies Stupid


Defense News
February 15, 2016
COMMENTARY

War Makes Victorious Armies Stupid

A Rebuilt Army After Vietnam Is Regressing


Twenty-five years ago, late in the afternoon of February 26, 1991, 260 American soldiers with 19 tanks and 26 Bradley fighting vehicles in the two lead cavalry troops of an 1,100 man armored cavalry battle group charged out of a sandstorm and caught the rear guard of Iraq’s Republican Guard Corps in the open desert along the North-South grid line referred to as “73 Easting.”

Taken by surprise, the numerically superior, full-strength, 2,500-man Iraqi brigade with T-72 tanks in defensive positions supported by mines, artillery and infantry with anti-tank weapons was swept away in a battle of annihilation. Attacking American soldiers lost one dead, six wounded and one destroyed Bradley.

Americans in Washington were surprised. A chorus of television pundits, academics and retired Army generals had warned that American soldiers would suffer heavy casualties. Retired Army Chief of Staff Gen. Edward Meyer actually declared that war with Iraq would produce 10,000 to 30,000 US casualties.

The generals commanding Army forces in the Middle East worried that Meyer was right. They had not seen action since Vietnam and they irrationally inflated the Iraqi Army’s fighting power. They should have known better.

Rebuilding the Army
The courageous and intelligent performance of American soldiers in battle of 73 Easting was testimony to the superior combination of training, technology and human capital that the US Army’s post-Vietnam leadership, Gens. William DePuy, Paul Gorman and Donn Starry, began building in the mid-1970s.

DePuy, the commander of Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), was the principal force driving change. DePuy saw warfare through a different lens. He had led an infantry platoon from Utah Beach through the Battle of the Bulge in World War II.

DePuy acknowledged the US Army’s defeat in Vietnam, but he knew the US Army had to change its focus to fight a capable opponent like the Soviet armed forces.

Israel’s sobering experience in the 1973 war with Egypt and Syria reinforced DePuy’s conviction that the Army needed a new war-fighting doctrine to guide investments in human capital, organization, and technology. The battle of 73 Easting was DePuy’s crowning achievement.

Acquisition Misfires
Sadly, war often makes victorious armies stupid and Desert Storm was no exception. Twenty-five years later, DePuy’s Army is in ruins.

Thanks to a series of multi-billion-dollar acquisition failures like the sprawling $20 billion Future Combat System, the Ground Combat Vehicle and Armed Aerial Scout, the US Army is caught in a modernization death spiral.
The outcome is an unfocused, single- service acquisition plan designed to upgrade 1980s vintage platforms and weapon systems or selectively replace systems inside the old structure on a one-for-one basis with comparable, more expensive versions of existing aircraft, tanks, trucks and guns.

Any closed system evolves toward a state of entropy and the US Army is very, very closed. Closed systems also breed fear of the kind of change in organization and technology that Gen. DePuy and his successors embraced.

The idea of moving the US Army out of the industrial-age structure based on single-service self-sufficiency into an organizational design based on integrated, joint operations or service interdependency remains anathema to the US Army.

The critical need for an Army composed of self-contained independent battle groups that operate on land the way the Navy’s ships operate at sea within the framework of joint, integrated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; strike; maneuver and sustainment is stubbornly and myopically resisted. As a result, the opportunity to pursue full-spectrum rapid prototyping of powerful new operational capabilities — organizing construct, human capital strategy and equipment, not just the technology — is lost. Instead, the Army clings to brigade combat teams, in uneven states of readiness, dependent on division and corps headquarters and support structures.

In 1991, the US Army stripped out several divisions to field full-strength brigades and divisions in Saudi Arabia before engaging the enemy. In today’s come-as-you-are war-fighting environment, this is a non-starter.

How Many 4-Stars?
Like the other services, the US Army’s organization for combat should not be viewed in isolation from its “corporate overhead.” The fact that four Army four stars — George Marshall, Douglas MacArthur, Dwight Eisenhower and Henry “Hap” Arnold— could command and effectively employ 6 million American soldiers in World War II while today’s shrinking Army of 490,000 needs six four stars to manage the force should alert the politicians in both parties to the Army’s problems.

Breaking open closed systems is never pleasant, but it must be done. The Army’s passion for rewarding officers who reinforce their bosses’ prejudices and beliefs makes the task even more challenging.

If nothing is done, Americans will end up much like Mark Baum, the hedge fund manager in the “The Big Short.” Baum was horrified to discover that widespread fraud in the mortgage market would precipitate an economic collapse on a national, even global scale.

If nothing is done, Americans will be equally horrified when they are surprised not by victory, but defeat.


By Douglas Macgregor, executive vice president of BMG LLC, a decorated combat veteran and author. His newest book, “Margin of Victory,” will be available in June
.


 http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/commentary/2016/02/15/commentary-war-makes-victorious-armies-stupid/80204146/