Tuesday, November 29, 2022

The American Conservative 11/29/2022

 


Washington’s Carthaginian Peace Collides With Reality

The Biden administration refuses to tell the American people the truth: Ukraine is not winning and will not win this war.

Douglas Macgregor

Nov 29, 2022
12:03 AM

https://www.theamericanconservative.com/washingtons-carthaginian-peace-collides-with-reality/

The national political and military leaders who committed America to wars of choice in Vietnam, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq, did so as a rule because they were convinced the fighting would be short and decisive. American presidents, presidential advisors, and senior military leaders never stopped to consider that national strategy, if it exists at all, consists of avoiding conflict unless the nation is attacked and compelled to fight.

The latest victim of this mentality is Ukraine. In the absence of a critical root-and-branch analysis of Russia’s national power and strategic interests, American senior military leaders and their political bosses viewed Russia through a narrowly focused lens that magnified U.S. and Ukrainian strengths but ignored Russia’s strategic advantages—geographic depth, almost limitless natural resources, high social cohesion, and the military-industrial capacity to rapidly scale up its military power. 

Ukraine is now a war zone subject to the same treatment the U.S. armed forces inflicted on Germany and Japan during the Second World War, on Vietnam in the 1960s, and on Iraq over decades. Power grids, transportation networks, communications infrastructure, fuel production, and ammunition storage sites are being systematically destroyed. Millions of Ukrainians continue to flee the war zone in pursuit of safety, with ominous consequences for Europe’s societies and economies. 

Meanwhile, the Biden administration repeatedly commits the unpardonable sin in a democratic society of refusing to tell the American people the truth: contrary to the Western media’s popular “Ukrainian victory” narrative, which blocks any information that contradicts it, Ukraine is not winning and will not win this war. Months of heavy Ukrainian casualties, resulting from an endless series of pointless attacks against Russian defenses in Southern Ukraine, have dangerously weakened Ukrainian forces. 

Predictably, NATO’s European members, which bear the brunt of the war’s impact on their societies and economies, are growing more disenchanted with Washington’s Ukrainian proxy war. European populations are openly questioning the veracity of claims in the press about the Russian state and American aims in Europe. The influx of millions of refugees from Ukraine, along with a combination of trade disputes, profiteering from U.S. arms sales, and high energy prices risks turning European public opinion against both Washington’s war and NATO. 

Russia has also undergone a transformation. In the opening years of President Putin’s term of office, the Russian Armed Forces were organized, trained, and equipped for exclusively national territorial defense. But the conduct of the Special Military Operation (SMO) in Ukraine has demonstrated the inadequacy of this approach for Russia’s National Security in the 21st century. 

The opening phase of the SMO was a limited operation with a narrow purpose and restricted goals. The critical point is that Moscow never intended to do more than persuade Kiev and Washington that Moscow would fight to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO, as well as the further mistreatment of Russians in Ukraine. The SMO was, however, based on invalid assumptions and was terminated. As it turned out, the limited nature of the SMO achieved the opposite of the outcome that Moscow desired, conveying the impression of weakness, rather than strength.

After concluding that the underpinning assumptions regarding Washington’s readiness to negotiate and compromise were invalid, Putin directed the STAVKA to develop new operational plans with new goals: first, to crush the Ukrainian enemy; second, to remove any doubt in Washington and European capitols that Russia will establish victory on its own terms; and, third, to create a new territorial status quo commensurate with Russia’s national security needs.

Once the new plan was submitted and approved, President Putin agreed to an economy of force operation to defend Russian territorial gains with minimal forces until the required resources, capabilities, and manpower were assembled for decisive operations. Putin also appointed a new theater commander, General Sergei Surovikin, a senior officer who understands the mission and possesses the mindset to deliver success. 

The coming offensive phase of the conflict will provide a glimpse of the new Russian force that is emerging and its future capabilities. At this writing, 540,000 Russian combat forces are assembled in Southern Ukraine, Western Russia, and Belarus. The numbers continue to grow, but the numbers already include 1,000 rocket artillery systems, thousands of tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones, plus 5,000 armored fighting vehicles, including at least 1,500 tanks, hundreds of manned fixed-wing attack aircraft, helicopters, and bombers. This new force has little in common with the Russian army that intervened 9 months ago on February 24, 2022.

It is now possible to project that the new Russian armed forces that will evolve from the crucible of war in Ukraine will be designed to execute strategically decisive operations. The resulting Russian force will likely take its inspiration from the force design and operational framework recommended in Colonel General Makhmut Gareev’s work, If War Comes Tomorrow? The Contours of Future Armed Conflict. The new military establishment will consist of much larger forces-in-being that can conduct decisive operations on relatively short notice with minimal reinforcement and preparation. 

Put differently, by the time the conflict ends, it appears Washington will have prompted the Russian State to build up its military power, the very opposite of the fatal weakening that Washington intended when it embarked on its course of military confrontation with Moscow. 

But none of these developments should surprise anyone in Washington, D.C. Beginning with Biden’s speech in Warsaw effectively demanding regime change in Moscow, the Biden administration refused to see foreign policy in terms of strategy. Like a stupid general who insists on defending every inch of ground to the last man, President Biden confirmed the United States’s commitment to oppose Russia and, potentially, any nation state that fails to measure up to globalism’s hypocritical democratic standards, regardless of the cost to the American people, whether in terms of their security or prosperity. 

Biden’s speech in Warsaw was hot with emotion and mired in the ideology of moralizing globalism that is popular in Washington, London, Paris, and Berlin. But for Moscow, the speech was tantamount to a Carthaginian Peace plan. Biden’s “take no prisoners” conduct of U.S. foreign policy means the outcome of the next phase of the Ukrainian War will not only destroy the Ukrainian state. It will also demolish the last vestiges of the postwar liberal order and produce a dramatic shift in power and influence across Europe, especially in Berlin, away from Washington to Moscow and, to a limited extent, to Beijing. 

Tuesday, November 15, 2022

Jay Dyer 11/15/2022



Great Reset, Russia, Ukraine & Western Geopolitical Strategies - Col Douglas Macgregor

"Col. Douglas Macgregor is a decorated combat veteran, the author of five books, a PhD, and a defense and foreign policy consultant. He was commissioned in the Regular Army in 1976 after 1 year at VMI and 4 years at West Point. In 2004, Macgregor retired with the rank of Colonel. In 2020, the President appointed Macgregor to serve as Senior Advisor to the Secretary of Defense, a post he held until President Trump left office. He holds an MA in comparative politics and a PhD in international relations from the University of Virginia.

Macgregor is widely known inside the U.S., Europe, Israel, Russia, China and Korea for both his leadership in the Battle of 73 Easting, the U.S. Army’s largest tank battle since World War II, and for his ground breaking books on military transformation: Breaking the Phalanx (Praeger, 1997) and Transformation under Fire (Praeger, 2003). Macgregor’s recommendations for change in Force Design and “integrated all arms-all effects” operations have profoundly influenced force development in Israel, Russia and China. In 2010, Macgregor traveled to Seoul, Korea to advise the ROK Ministry of Defense on force design. In 2019, Transformation under Fire was selected by Lt. Gen. Aviv Kohavi, Chief of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF), as the intellectual basis for IDF transformation. His fifth book, Margin of Victory: Five Battles that Changed the Face of Modern War from Naval Institute Press is available in Chinese, as well as, English and will soon appear in Hebrew.

 In 28 years of service Macgregor taught in the Department of Social Sciences at West Point, commanded the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, and served as the Director of the Joint Operations Center at SHAPE during the 1999 Kosovo Air Campaign for which he was awarded the Defense Superior Service medal. In January 2002, at Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s insistence the USCENTCOM Commander listened to Colonel Macgregor’s concept for the offensive to seize Baghdad. The plan was largely adopted, but assumed no occupation of Iraq by U.S. Forces.




Tucker Carlson Tonight 11/14/2022

 



with Tulsi Gabbard

Never-Ending Funding for Zelensky

Defense Secretary LLoyd Austin to Host 50 Nation Virtual Meeting to Discuss New Round of Ukraine Aid

Biden's Plan for Ukraine:  Another Blank Check





Thursday, November 10, 2022

Redacted with Clayton Morris 11/10/2022



Why is NO ONE stopping this? U.S. now provoking war with China

Over the past 24 hours both Taiwan and the U.S. say China is closing in on an invasion. Why is the U.S. actively trying to provoke a war with China? Col. Douglas MacGregor joins us to discuss. Also new data on excess deaths is troubling. We'll look at the latest data from the U.S. and U.K.  




Thursday, November 3, 2022

Real America with Dan Ball 11/2/2022

 


W/ Col. Doug Macgregor, 

U.S. Boots On The Ground In Ukraine?


Judge Napolitano - Judging Freedom 11/3/2022

 





Will Biden Gamble on a Ukraine Coalition?



The American Conservative 11/3/2022

 

Will Biden Gamble on a Ukraine Coalition?

The Washington establishment is considering a risky and ill-defined intervention in Europe.

by Douglas Macgregor

https://www.theamericanconservative.com/will-biden-gamble-on-a-ukraine-coalition/

When Napoleon Bonaparte began his 1812 campaign to conquer Russia, he led the largest “coalition of the willing” in history. In addition to its French core, Bonaparte’s army of more than 400,000 consisted of Italian, Dutch, German, and Polish soldiers. They were at best unenthusiastic. Frankly, other than the French, only Napoleon’s Polish allies were truly eager to march on Moscow.

By the time Bonaparte’s multinational force reached Moscow, paralyzing cold, ruinous battles, exhaustion, disease, and poor logistical planning reduced the original invasion force to less than half of its original strength. It was not long before Prussia and its North German allies defected to the Russians while the remainder (minus the Poles) deserted or died on the march home. 

Today, the Biden White House appears to be considering the use of a multinational force aimed at Russia. The NATO alliance is unable to reach a unanimous decision to intervene militarily in support of Ukraine in its war with Russia. But as signaled recently by David Petraeus, the president and his generals are evaluating their own “coalition of the willing.” The coalition would allegedly consist of primarily, but not exclusively, Polish and Romanian forces, with the U.S. Army at its core, for employment in Ukraine.

All military campaigns succeed or fail based on strategic assumptions that underpin operational planning and execution. Without knowing the details of the ongoing discussions, it is still possible to raise questions about the coalition’s proposed operational “purpose, method, and end state.” 

First, what is the aim of the coalition? Is the aim to expel Russian forces from Ukrainian territory? Is the aim to reinforce Ukrainian defense lines and achieve a ceasefire for negotiations? Or is the coalition merely a device to drag the rest of the NATO alliance into a war with Russia that very few Europeans will support? 

Second, what will U.S. air and ground forces do if they are decisively engaged from the moment they cross the Polish and Romanian Borders into western Ukraine? The Russian High Command will no doubt identify the U.S. military component as the coalition’s center of gravity. It follows that Russian military power will focus first and foremost on the destruction of the U.S. warfighting structure together with its space-based command, control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.

Third, is Washington building a “coalition of the willing” for political reasons or because it anticipates a resource-intensive commitment and needs regional allies to share the burden? Since it is unlikely that conventional U.S. military power would defeat conventional Russian military power on its own, can the U.S.-led coalition assemble the diverse military capabilities required to dominate Russian forces with enough striking power to compel a change in Russian behavior? Equally important, can U.S. and allied forces protect Europe’s numerous transportation networks, as well as air and naval bases, from Russian air and missile attack? 

Fourth, will the coalition’s conduct of operations be subject to limitations deemed essential to allied partners? Differences of opinion always exist on questions of how to fight the opponent, how far to move, and just how much to risk. Lack of clarity about specific objectives can have serious consequences. In other words, how much unity of command can U.S. military commanders really expect from their allies in war and will the demand for unity of command outweigh purely national interests? It is useful to remember that Moscow enjoys complete authority over all its forces including those of its partners and allies. Russian unity of command is absolute. Moscow is not compelled to cope with diverging preferences and opinions from coalition members.

Finally, Jens Stoltenberg, the Secretary General of NATO insists that Ukraine’s failure to prevail in its war with Russia would be interpreted as a defeat for NATO. Would heavy losses inflicted on U.S. ground forces in a confrontation with Russian military power not also signal Washington’s defeat? How rapidly could U.S. and allied forces replace their losses? Would severe U.S. losses raise the specter of a U.S. nuclear response? When does support for Ukraine put NATO’s security and survival at risk?

Washington’s recently announced reiteration of strategic ambiguity regarding the “first use of nuclear weapons” raises additional questions. Spokesmen for the Biden administration indicate that the president will not follow through on his 2020 pledge and declare that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack against the United States or its allies. 

Instead, President Biden approved a version of the policy from the Obama administration that permits the use of nuclear weapons not only in retaliation to a nuclear attack, but also to respond to non-nuclear threats. President Biden’s decision is at least as dangerous and destructive to American and Allied goals as was the Morgenthau Plan: a plan to deindustrialize Germany that, while rejected, probably lengthened the war against Nazi Germany by at least half a year. Does anyone in Washington, D.C., really believe that this new policy makes a nuclear war with Russia less likely? 

Military strategy is about the relationship of means to ends. National political and military leaders are preoccupied with means and think too little about ends. It is not enough to be a good technician, today’s political and military leaders must be serious strategists, acutely sensitive to the limits which America’s strengths and weaknesses impose on strategic choices. 

The cost to Americans and Europeans of escalating the conflict should not be underestimated. The president and his generals must appreciate how injurious military failure would be to an American society already weakened by 20 years of self-defeating deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. American military morale is at a low point. Recruiting for the U.S. Armed Forces, especially the ground forces, is harder than at any time since the 1970s. American economic performance is fragile. Europe’s economic outlook is bleaker still. 

In his fight with Russia, Bonaparte not only badly misjudged his opponent, but he also grossly misjudged his allies. President Biden and his generals should not make the same mistakes in Ukraine.


Wednesday, November 2, 2022

Redacted w Clayton Morris 11/2/2022




Warnings this is about to get much worse, Putin readies for NATO attack

Col. Douglas MacGregor joins Redacted with the very latest warning signs of NATO and multinational forces mounting for an invasion of Russia. Putin continues the mobilization of forces. 




Backup Video:

Tuesday, November 1, 2022

Global Research, 10/30/2022

 


Eight Months into Putin’s war. A New Era. For Ukraine, The European Union, and the World

Interview with Col Douglas Macgregor 

By Michael Welch

“It’s very clear now that groups of Russian forces numbering over five hundred thousand have assembled in Western Russia, southern Ukraine, and in Belorussia. So an offensive, a major conventional what we would call “high end conventional” offence is coming in November and December!”

– Col Douglas Macgregor (from this week’s interview)

Audio Only