Friday, April 13, 2018

Trump Can't Alter Syria's Future

Douglas Macgregor
April 13, 2018

The last few days in Washington have read like the script from 1972’s blockbuster movie The Godfather. Only this time, President Trump is doing his best imitation of Sonny Corleone.

Sonny: I’m going to decide what’s going to be done.

Tom Hagen: All right, but your war is costing us a lot of money, nothing’s coming in. We can’t do business.

Sonny: Well, neither can they! Don’t worry about it.

Tom Hagen: They don’t have our overhead. . . . We can’t afford a stalemate.

Sonny: Well, then, there ain’t no more stalemate—I’m gonna end it by killin’ that ol’ bastard! I’m gonna . . . kill . . .

Tom Hagen: Yeah, well, you’re getting a great reputation! I hope you’re enjoying it.

Sonny: Well, you just do what I tell you to do! Goddamn it. If I had a wartime consigliere—a Sicilian—I wouldn’t be in this shape!

Like Sonny, President Trump is in the grip of a fanatical urge to act. He’s determined to punish evildoers in Syria for the alleged chlorine gas attack, telling his cabinet that if involved, Assad—and even Putin—will be held accountable: “Everybody is going to pay a price. He will. Everybody will.”

The advocates for military action include the usual suspects. Most are President Trump’s most severe critics, wrongly placing blame for events in Syria on Washington’s chronic failure to intervene in the Syrian Civil War. They reflect the prevailing bipartisan “globalist,” interventionist “wisdom” inside the Beltway: that bombing Syria will induce the warring parties to comply with American demands for polite restraint in a bloody civil war where all sides practice scorched-earth tactics.

No doubt, the interventionists are confident that President Trump’s use of American military power will result in a tolerable political compromise, enabling Syria’s diverse peoples—Arabs, Kurds, Shia, Druze, Christian and Sunni—to live peacefully in a harmonious, secular democratic state. Is that not what happened after the U.S. military intervened in Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan?

President Trump knows better. Bombing Syria is exactly the kind of military action that has made America’s regional opponents stronger and its allies weaker since 2001.

Washington’s 2003 decision to attack Iraq—to occupy the country, disband its army and govern it with American military power—precipitated the breakdown in regional order. The resulting war of U.S. military occupation installed a Shia Arab dictatorship in Baghdad and made Iran the master of Iraq. The outcome produced a cloud of violence that spread across the Middle East and North Africa—a region characterized by underdeveloped economies, stagnant social structures and peoples who define themselves by religious sect and ethnic and tribal identity, not by the artificial dictatorships created in the aftershock of decolonization.

Whether the United States’ small, vulnerable light-infantry force of two thousand troops stays in Syria another six months or another six years, the country’s fate will not be decided by Washington. Moscow, Ankara, Tehran and Damascus will divide it, or Syria will descend into a permanent state of ethnic and religious warfare. Either way, the developing struggle for control of northeastern Syria between Turks and Iranians suggests a low probability that an American bombing offensive will do anything more than force cohesion on the unnatural alliance of Russians, Turks and Iranians.

As a successful businessman, the president knows that without a comprehensive business strategy tied to a realistic understanding of the marketplace, corporations hemorrhage cash, wither and die. Syria is a marketplace where outsiders invest at their own peril.

President Trump’s instinct to leave Syria as soon as possible is sound. The Islamic State’s influence always depended on its ability to seize and hold territory. That territory is now gone.

Yet there is another reason for President Trump to avoid entanglement in Syria. The America First agenda must succeed—and for the agenda to succeed, the Trump presidency must succeed.

Right now, the greatest danger to the Trump presidency is a renewal of Washington’s refusal since 1991 to accept any regional solution in the Middle East other than one imposed by American military power. The danger is a destructive collision with the triumvirate of powers that have tangible, concrete strategic interests in Syria: Russia, Iran and Turkey. Unlike the weak insurgents Americans have faced since 2001, these nations possess powerful air forces, air defenses, armies and navies.

It is never easy for an aggressive commander in chief to resist offensive action, but any significant military action in Syria risks confrontation with these powers on strategic terms that do not favor the United States. Moreover, American military action is simply out of line with Syria’s actual importance to the United States. President Trump would be wise to heed Tom Hagen’s advice to Sonny Corleone—or risk having his legacy shattered on the causeway, like Sonny.

Col. (ret) Douglas Macgregor, U.S. Army, is a decorated combat veteran, PhD and author of five books; his latest is Margin of Victory (Naval Institute Press, 2016).

Image: A Syrian soldier stands guard near destroyed buildings in Jobar, eastern Ghouta, April 2, 2018. Reuters/Omar Sanadiki.

Wednesday, March 14, 2018

Veterans, Doctors Alike Stranded as Vet Choice Fails to Pay its Bills

The people and events described in this article are is tragic and unacceptable. Without question, fighting the last 17 years of interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have taken a toll on the white population. However, the incompetent, "under privileged" people who staff the VA are worse. When veterans are treated in this way we are nearing the end of our history as a great power. Our nation beneath the surface, appears to be in ruins.

12 March 2018

Veterans, Doctors Alike Stranded as Vet Choice Fails to Pay its Bills

By Stephanie Earls | The Gazette (Colorado Springs, Colo.) 
One day in 2016, Army veteran Jason White finished cleaning his pistol, wrapped his hand around the grip, and put the barrel to his temple.
He'd had enough. Five years after his deployment in Afghanistan ended when an IED explosion pinned him between two vehicles, he was 100 percent disabled, in pain and still at war inside. This time, though, it felt like he was fighting the enemy alone.
"I'd had three deaths in the family, and four guys in my unit who'd committed suicide," he said. "Everything was going wrong, everything was bad."
White pulled the trigger, but the weapon jammed.
After his wife learned what he had done she accompanied him to the Department of Veterans Affairs' Floyd K. Lindstrom Clinic in Colorado Springs, where White said he was told he faced a six-month wait to see a therapist.
"They knew I was suicidal and still it was six months to talk to someone," said White, 30. "My wife was extremely mad."
A few days later, White got a call saying the VA had referred him to the Veterans Choice Program, a federally-funded initiative that would pay for his visits to a provider in the community. An appointment with participating Colorado Springs psychologist Michael Sunich was set up for the following week.
"I was skeptical of seeing someone to talk about all the issues to begin with ... things I wouldn't even talk with my wife about ... but I started seeing him weekly," said White, whose five years of active duty had left him with a crushed spine, severe traumatic brain injury, post traumatic stress disorder and insomnia, among other debilitating ailments.
After several months of meeting with Sunich, White says his life "turned around."
"Without him, I probably wouldn't be here," he said.
Gulf War veteran Frederick Zappone said he feels the same.
"I went to Desert Storm and came back and there wasn't the help for us, the people to talk to. A lot of soldiers turned to the bottle, or to drugs. My battle buddy didn't get the help he needed and he killed himself," said Zappone, 52, who sees Sunich through Veterans Choice for one-on-one and group sessions. "Somebody like doc is gold to me. There's no question he's saved my life, or saved me from taking the life of someone else."
Their "doc" debated whether to let the men know he'd been treating them for free for months, and battling Health Net Federal Services -- the third-party manager of Vet Choice for the VA -- at almost every step.
"This isn't their fault. They checked all the right boxes," said Sunich, who's worked with veterans since 1980 and considers the job more calling than career. "But I checked all the right boxes, too."
Sunich's Gone West Consulting and Psychological Services is a modest private practice based in a couple rooms in a complex off South Eighth Street. Overhead's low, but after months of submitting claims and receiving no payments from Health Net -- nor a reissued check for $4,000 after the original never arrived -- Sunich said his office bills were past due and the pressure was starting to affect his life at home, where he and his wife, Julie, are raising 14-year-old twins.
By the end of 2017, around 85 percent of Gone West's patients were veterans referred through the Choice program, and the VA owed him more than $20,000.
"People are going to be told next month that they won't be getting rent, etcetera," said Julie Sunich in January. "If we were independently wealthy and he was retired and wanted to do this for the benefit of the country ... but that's not really where we are right now. It is making an impact on our family."
Julie reminded her husband that if payments didn't start showing up soon, he was going to have to consider some hard decisions.
"We'll get paid," Michael assured his wife.
"Yeah, maybe," Julie said. "But when?"
A month later, the check for $4,000 finally arrived.
The 5th Congressional District, an area comprising Colorado Springs and its suburbs, including Fort Carson, the Air Force AcademyPeterson and Schriever Air Force bases, is home to more military veterans than any other district in America.
But unlike in other cities with large military and veteran populations, the VA does not operate a medical center in the Springs. For the district's estimated 96,000 former military, the closest VA hospital is in Denver.
The Lindstrom Clinic is new and impressive and offers a range of services, but it's an outpatient facility, not a hospital. The clinic's honeymoon, too, has been a rough one, plagued by mismanagement, complaints and scandal as the understaffed and overbooked center struggled to meet one of the driving arguments behind its construction: improving access to care -- especially mental health and suicide prevention services -- for veterans living along the southern Front Range.
Within two years of opening in 2014, Lindstrom patients were facing some of the nation's longest wait times -- 30 days or more -- and, in a number of cases, records had been falsified to make it appear drastically otherwise, according to a 2016 report by the VA's Office of Inspector General.
In their response to the report, Colorado lawmakers demanded a congressional probe. They also wanted to know why the VA wasn't taking advantage of Veterans Choice, the federal program created to address precisely this scenario.
The VA's 2016 investigation of Lindstrom found that, of 450 cases reviewed, 288 patients who qualified for the zero co-pay Vet Choice program didn't receive timely referrals. In some cases, referrals weren't made at all.
U.S. Rep. Mike Coffman questioned the justification for VA's seeming reluctance to "farm out" patients to the private sector.
"If they allow it to work, what the Choice act will do is stimulate some kind of competition where the VA will have to treat the veterans as actual patients rather than numbers," he said.
When it was signed into law in late 2014, with $10 billion in funding, the Veterans Access, Choice and Accountability Choice Act marked a major revolution in health care access for veterans facing long waits, or drives, for appointments at their local VA clinics.
But after three years, the hastily-constructed policy -- and its management by Health Net Federal Services -- is effectively driving away the very community caregivers on which it relies.
"Everybody who's had anything to do with Health Net has a horror story about it," said Colorado Springs psychologist Judith Ray. "A lot of my colleagues have heard those horror stories and said, 'I will not accept Veterans Choice.'"
Putting people back together is expensive, and a process that cannot be done piecemeal, said licensed professional counselor and Desert Storm veteran Jeffery Erickson, whose father fought in Vietnam.
In January, Erickson was still awaiting payment for Vet Choice patients he'd seen three months prior. If he has to, he'll keep seeing them pro bono, he said.
"A whole generation has gone by and we're still in combat. These people are trained to run toward conflict. They've seen and done things most people can't imagine, in service of their country, then they get back and have 40 or 50 years of a life left that they've got to relearn how to live," Erickson said. "The VA should be doing everything it can to make that easier for them."
Health Net Federal Services and another regional contractor that processes VA payments to civilian providers, TriWest Healthcare Alliance, became the target of a federal grand jury investigation after an audit by the VA's internal watchdog in late 2017 found that improper billing led to payment errors in approximately 224,000 of 2 million Choice claims processed between the program's start date in November 2014 and Sept. 30, 2016.
As providers in Colorado Springs were fighting to get paid in dribs and drabs, the audit found that Health Net and TriWest collected an estimated $39 million more than they should have, in part from payments that were reimbursed by VA but not distributed.
"The VA, the Choice program, they're the worst," said Karen Lee, owner of the Springs' Ponderosa Medical Billing, which serves 11 private sector mental health providers who, collectively, are owed about $73,000 by Vet Choice. "All insurance companies take between 14 to 30 days to process and pay a claim, some a lot sooner these days. Vet Choice, you send claims in and sometimes they'll pay in less than a month and other times, it's three to four to five to six months, or never. For a doctor to do this and expect to get paid for it ... it's a pretty risky business."
President Donald Trump repeatedly has said that overhauling the VA and improving care -- specifically mental health care -- for veterans is a top priority. In January, he seemed to follow through on that promise, signing an executive order granting unconditional access to psychological and suicide prevention services and resources to "new veterans" for at least a year after their discharge, retirement or separation from service, a critical period when the symptoms of PTSD can begin to take root and treatment can be most effective. That order was scheduled to take effect last Friday.
But how is a system that's clearly unequipped to manage its current obligations to veterans prepared to handle tens of thousands of new troops returning from America's longest war?
Karen Lee has noticed the trend among her mental health provider clients, and anecdotally at large: More are choosing to cut back on the number of Vet Choice patients they treat, or have made the decision not to participate in the program at all.
"The ones I'm worried about are the veterans. That's who it's affecting more, and especially when it comes to mental health," Lee said. "These veterans they're treating, a lot are suicidal. They're fragile. A doc isn't just going to say, come back in three months and we'll start treatment again when you're reauthorized and I can get paid."
Sunich didn't know much about Vet Choice program when he got the call in July 2016 asking if he would begin treating a veteran whose visits would be authorized and reimbursed at $125 a session. The program sounded like a good one: letting vets see someone in their community who can see them right away.
When the payment timeline started to drag late last summer, Sunich chalked it up to the slow trickle down of $2.1 billion in emergency funding allocated by Congress in August to extend the program.
"We would send in a request for reauthorization and, on good faith, I continued to see these guys operating on the assumption that they would be authorized, because the VA seemed to have a strong commitment to mental health and suicide prevention," Sunich said. "But we never heard back and I stopped getting paid."
Sunich and other providers like him have limited options -- all bad: work with no guarantee of pay, abruptly stop treating some of their most emotionally and psychologically vulnerable patients, or pass the costs on to veterans. The 2016 review by the VA cited a number of cases where unpaid bills for Vet Choice trickled down to veterans and negatively impacted their credit ratings.
"Some of these guys struggle to afford a co-pay, so I'm not going to look to them to cover that," Sunich said. "This is the VA's responsibility."
Ponderosa Medical Billing serves about 120 local doctors and health providers; about half are in the mental health field and most are small practices -- "one doctor shops," such as those run by Michael Sunich and Judith Ray, Lee said.
"Sunich is owed the most, at $28,000, but almost every single one of them (who accepts Vet Choice) is owed between $4,000 and $5,000," said Lee, who's been in the medical billing business for almost 30 years.
Some of the Vet Choice claims have been outstanding since early 2017.
The why of it seems to be not a lack of funds but a patient reauthorization process that seems engineered to result in reimbursement denials, Lee said. Following up on a claim or authorization requires devoted oversight, patience and hours upon hours on the phone.
"The initial authorization usually is pretty smooth, but when it's time to reauthorize we turn in the paperwork and it takes up to three months for them to say it's OK to start seeing the doctor again. Or, a reauthorization is canceled and they don't let anyone know," Lee said. "If you call, you're on hold half a day waiting to talk to someone and then they probably can't help you."
Compounding the frustration is the fact that, because the program is run by the government, there's no consumer watchdog to hear complaints.
"Mental health claims are one of the easiest specialties for me to file for, except when it comes to the VA, but there's no governing board, no insurance board for me or doctors to complain to, other than Congress," Lee said.
Judith Ray started seeing patients through Vet Choice in late 2015.
"I was kind of dumped into it without knowing what I was getting in to, but I will not turn down a veteran," said Ray, who's treated hundreds of veterans in her career.
She saw one of her Vet Choice patients -- a man whose PTSD is so severe he lives in the crawlspace of his home -- on a weekly basis for a year before reimbursement arrived.
"They couldn't tell me, they couldn't tell him, why they weren't paying," said Ray. "They pay sporadically. There's no rhyme or reason to it."
She took her complaints to Colorado U.S. Sen. Michael Bennet, whose office was able to help recoup some of the $12,000 she was owed, and get reimbursements flowing again for a while, but Ray said she was forced to make the difficult decision to stop accepting new Vet Choice clients at the end of 2017.
"So many veterans are getting referred to Choice, and so many are getting turned down because ... a doctor or psychologist has to say. 'Sorry, I no longer take Veterans Choice because I don't get paid,'" Ray said.
And when the government doesn't pay, it's ultimately the veterans who do.
"These guys sign up, go and serve their country and they come home and this happens. They feel betrayed, handed off by the VA, and it compounds their PTSD," Ray said.
Despite major systemic problems, the damning federal review and ongoing audit, Health Net Federal Services was awarded -- and on Jan. 1 began running -- the government contract running Tricare West, the region's other major manager of veterans health benefits.
Ray said she's lost sleep over it.
"A lot of my patients are Tricare, so, yes, I am worried," Ray said. "My big question to Health Net is, where is the money going if it's not going to providers? This is hundreds of thousands of dollars. But we're never told, and we can't ask questions." 

Sunday, March 11, 2018

Why Trump should not meet with Kim

This is what Trump should have said in his response to KJU:

"Thank you for your gracious invitation. However, President Moon has my complete trust and confidence. I will support the arrangements that you and President Moon make regarding denuclearization and stability on the Korean Peninsula. In the meantime, I wish you and president Moon success in the struggle for peace and understanding."

KJU knows that Trump is all about display and so is KJU. Having Trump come to Korea to meet him only creates an image that suggests we have capitulated

We have been here before and our involvement has done nothing in the long run. NK will demand cash and to have sanctions lifted just like they always had. And as before NK will refrain from further launches and tests but not give up their nuclear program. We are already seeing patterns from the 1955 negotiations. (See the part about the car salesman from C. Turner Joy’s ‘How Communists Negotiate’ full text here 

By accepting this invitation we are expected to make good on the deal while the ROK gets what they want: No war.

Instead, Trump needs to pass the ball to Moon and walk away. Moon will take the ball and run with it all the way to the end zone. It's time for us to remove the ground force and get out. NK is not our problem. Let Moon and Xi solve it. 

Sunday, March 4, 2018

OPINION: An attack on North Korea could start a US-China war -- Don't do it

If sanctions on North Korea don't work, what's Plan B?

President Trump warns 'phase 2' of U.S. actions toward North Korea may be 'unfortunate for the world' if sanctions don't convince Kim Jong Un to abandon his nuclear ambitions; insight from retired U.S. Air Force Major General C. Donald Alston.

By Douglas Macgregor
 Following the Winter Olympics, South Korean President Moon Jae-in indicated he was ready to talk to North Korea and engage in diplomacy. And while Vice President Mike Pence – who earlier announced severe sanctions on the North –first signaled a willingness to talk, he quickly seemed to change course.
President Trump further indicated that he is considering a preventive military strike on the North if the sanctions failed to denuclearize the communist nation. But such a so-called “bloody nose” strike against North Korean missile sites and nuclear facilities stands an excellent chance of becoming a bloody disaster. 
China won't tolerate an unprovoked attack on North Korea, and President Moon will not support the use of South Korean forces as part of a U.S. military strike against North Korea.
South Koreans loathe the regime of North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un. But very few think that initiating a war on the Korean Peninsula will hasten reunification, let alone lead to lasting peace. In fact, 59 percent of South Koreans oppose a pre-emptive strike on North Korea’s nuclear facilities.
Consequently, if President Trump authorizes military action against North Korea, the most probable outcome will be war with China and the immediate expulsion of U.S. military forces from South Korea. President Moon will have no other choice if he is to avoid conflict with China.
And, contrary to expectations in Washington, Japan will decline to participate in Washington’s “bloody nose” extravaganza in any meaningful way. Tokyo will privately welcome a conflict that removes North Korea from the map, but will not put the Japanese home islands at risk to help Washington in its war with China.
The net result will be embarrassment on a global scale for Washington and the American people. The Trump presidency could well be destroyed.
On the other hand, it’s useful to point out that President Xi Jinping of China has actually cooperated with Washington to push North Korea to the brink of economic implosion. Xi has told Kim Jong Un that if he attacks his neighbors or the U.S., Beijing will not assist North Korea in any way.
The importance of Xi’s stance to U.S. military planners cannot be overstated. Military planning is always based on a mix of known capabilities relating to friendly and opposing weapon systems, as well as unknowable aspects of a potential opponent’s behavior. Predictably, in American military planning untested assumptions are often frequently shaped by wishful thinking.
Fortunately for the U.S., President Xi has taken precautions to disabuse Washington of any wishful thinking. If America initiates hostilities against North Korea, China will not sit on the sidelines.
According to South Korean sources, if we attack North Korea the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s Northern Theater Command is preparing the Chinese 78th Army Group for intervention on the ground to cope with the potential collapse of the North Korean state.
The Northern Theater Command in Manchuria also includes the 79th Army Group. Together, the two Chinese Army Groups positioned in Manchuria field 855 tanks, 819 Infantry Fighting Vehicles, 200 self-propelled guns, rocket artillery, missile defense units, support troops and several hundred attack aircraft – a force of roughly 300,000.
None of these points suggest that America’s nuclear arsenal could not quickly and thoroughly erase the North Korean state from the map. While that’s something that Washington can accomplish, a high-end conventional conflict with China on the Korean Peninsula is a contingency for which the U.S. armed forces are not prepared.
Any use of nuclear weapons to compensate for U.S. conventional military weakness – regardless of yield – would likely trigger a nuclear exchange with China that no sane person wants.
It is time to reconsider the wisdom of military action against North Korea. In their first meeting, President Moon asked President Trump to accelerate the transfer of wartime command of all Korean and U.S. armed forces on the Korean Peninsula to a Korean Army four-star general. President Trump was perplexed.
President Trump’s advisers had not prepared him for the question. For decades, a U.S. Army four-star general has exercised absolute authority over the South Korean-U.S. Combined Forces Command, the warfighting headquarters responsible for the defense and, if necessary, the defeat of external aggression against South Korea.
President Moon is the latest South Korean leader to conclude that without unambiguous South Korean national command authority over the armed forces on its soil, South Korea is not really a sovereign nation. He has a point.
The truth is that Washington is not equipped to “solve the problem” on the Korean Peninsula, largely because the problem is not ours to solve. South Korea is a brilliant success story. Now the United States mission on the Korean Peninsula is complete.
Seoul, not Washington, must now work with Beijing and Tokyo to solve the problem. For Washington, Step One is to signal American support for President Moon’s initiative of an inter-Korean dialogue.
Step Two is to turn over command of the Combined Forces Command to a South Korean four-star general as soon as possible. Make it clear that the destiny of the South Korean people rests in their own hands.
Retired Army Col. Douglas Macgregor is a decorated combat veteran, a Ph.D. and the author of five books; his most recent is Margin of Victory (Naval Institute Press, 2016).

Thursday, February 22, 2018

America Needs to Think About the Next War—Before It's Too Late

February 21, 2018

A U.S. Soldier with the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kansas, issues a command to his squad during platoon live-fire qualifications, Dec. 18, 2017, at the Novo Selo Training Area, in Mokren, Bulgaria. Flickr / U.S. Department of Defense

Inside democratic societies, shrewd and far-sighted defense strategies focused on modernizing armed forces for future wars are always difficult to achieve. Thus, when a modernization strategy succeeds as it did in 1991 with the Battle of 73 Easting, Americans should pay attention.
At 4:18 PM on 26 February 1991, the two lead cavalry troops of an 1,100-man Armored Cavalry Squadron consisting of Abrams tanks, Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and supporting artillery charged out of a sandstorm and attacked a full-strength 2,500-man Iraqi Republican Guard Brigade with T-72 tanks, BMPs and artillery in the Iraqi desert along the North-South grid line referred to as “73 Easting.” In the extreme violence that ensued, courageous and intelligent American soldiers applied a new, as yet untried combination of armor, mobility and firepower that crushed the Iraqi force.
By historical standards 73 Easting was an exceptional “first battle.” Most first battles from Bull Run and Kasserine Pass to the Ia Drang Valley ended badly. The Army’s senior leaders relearned the same bitter lesson: “Every successful business model, or military organization for combat, works until it doesn’t.”
The Battle of 73 Easting was different. The Armored Cavalry’s winning combination of organization, technology and human capital—the new, 1991 Army business model—was created in the mid-1970s, a time of draconian defense cutswhen U.S. warplanes couldn’t fly for a lack of spare parts, ships sat in port without fuel and soldiers exercised with tanks and guns that differed little from their WWII predecessors. However, when the funding for Army modernization finally arrived in the 1980s, the really hard work—thinking, experimentation and evaluation—was accomplished. New fighting formations could be fielded.
New business models don’t invent themselves. And devising new joint operational concepts along with new fighting formations assimilating new technologies and employing new tactics is hard work.
Fortunately, the new national military strategy points the way: Air Force, Naval and Army Forces must move away from low intensity conflict operations in permissive environments. New forces must be built that can deter, and, if necessary defeat capable nation-state opponents in high intensity conventional conflict. The new strategy also discards the doctrine of brute force—blind faith in the superiority of numbers—in favor of lethality and capability, not numbers in future force design.
Unfortunately, inside the U.S. Army the flood of cash from congress—$192 billion with $37 billion for modernization—is replacing the brute force theory with a fatally flawed strategy: impetuous, undisciplined spending to make the old Army fight better. The Army’s senior leaders are spending $27 billion of the Army fiscal 2019 modernization dollars on legacy systems; the contemporary equivalent of upgrading Sherman Tanks in the 1980s for war in 1991.
Put differently, the money has arrived as it did during the 1980s, but in contrast to the Army’s senior leaders in the 1970s, today’s senior leaders have not done the hard work to construct the new business model:
Identify the form that future warfare will take and the new warfighting missions that joint operations to deter, neutralize or destroy new threats will demand;
Perform the analysis to link the national strategy with operational concepts and desired capabilities;
Develop the new joint warfighting organization for combat—the new business model—through unconstrained experimentation and rigorous field testing;
Build the new command and control structure to integrate capabilities across service lines and guarantee unity of effort;
Ensure capability integration and shared technological development with aerospace and maritime forces (R, D&A).
During the 1970s, the politicians who were nominally in charge of overseeing the U.S. Army’s spending habits did not have to ask the Army’s senior leaders many hard questions. The officers who worked quietly in the background to build the new Army on the ruins of the force that fought in Vietnam knew their trade. Several fought in WWII, Korea and Vietnam.
The next “first battle” will be just as brutal as the Battle of 73 Easting, but it will be different. Winning it will require the methodical adaptation of men and machines inside new organizations for combat to achieve decisive victory in war.
Touting a collection of programs without an inherently joint warfighting organizational construct is not the way to modernize. Establishing a new headquarters with more generals from the same source that failed repeatedly to get the job done since 1991 is not an answer; it is obfuscation.
If the nation is to win the first battle of the next major war, then, the appointed and elected leaders of the executive and legislative branches must weigh in and ask the Army’s senior leaders the hard questions. They must be ready to reallocate resources to address the absence of a coherent and effective modernization strategy inside the U.S. Army before billions are lost.
Col. (ret) Douglas Macgregor was decorated for his leadership under fire in the 73 Easting. He is also a PhD and the author of five books. His most recent is Margin of Victory (Naval Institute Press, 2016).

Thursday, February 1, 2018

Upcoming Event


Mission Command in the 21st Century Army
28 Feb 2018 1330-1500
Arnold Conference Room, Lewis and Clark Center,
Fort Leavenworth, KS
Also Streaming Live on Facebook,
Army Leader Exchange


Futures Seminar
U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks
12 March 2018

Why the Army Isn't Prepared for the Next Great War 
January 31, 2018
After years of service inside the U.S. military’s cutthroat bureaucracy, senior officers can recite the lessons of the past, but very few can grasp their future implications.

Douglas Macgregor

Next week the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Airland will hold a hearing on Army modernization. Just twelve months ago, in a similar hearing, the U.S. Army was, according to its own senior leaders, in dismal shape. The question for the senators, who oversee Army readiness to deploy and fight, is whether anything has really changed since February 2017. The recent past explains why.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld famously said, “You go to war with the army you have.” Like a stopped clock that’s right twice a day, Rumsfeld was correct. Wars are seldom decided in a single, dramatic battle or by the appearance of a new, alleged “leap ahead” technology. Wars are decided in the decades before they begin; through years of innovative field experimentation and rapid prototyping based on rigorous analysis and historical study.

Rumsfeld was lucky. Instead of fighting in “the Super Bowl,” the U.S. Army confronted a “pick up team” consisting of Afghan and Arab insurgents. Without armies, air forces, air defenses or modern intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, the insurgents were too weak to seriously threaten America’s Cold War legacy Army.

Joint operational maneuvers on the scale of the 1944 breakout from Normandy or offensives to penetrate sophisticated air defenses like those the Germans built—operations that cost the U.S. and British Air Forces eighteen thousand bombers—were not required. Unfortunately, military “success” against pickup teams sets up armies for failure in the Super Bowl.

In 1940, Gen. Maxime Weygand, the supreme commander of French Forces, told a room of shocked politicians and generals, “We have gone to war with a 1918 Army against a German Army of 1939. It is sheer madness.” Weygand should not have been surprised.

After World War I, senior military leaders in the French and British Armies were compelled to concentrate on low-intensity conflict: suppressing rebellions (counterinsurgency) in from Africa to Southeast Asia while the armies they commanded transformed into colonial police forces. Superior French and British military technology and organization from World War I triumphed, but experience in hard-fought campaigns against non-state insurgent enemies between 1918 and 1936 did not transfer to war with the Wehrmacht or the Imperial Japanese Army.

Just five years after World War II, American soldiers endured a similar experience. Gen. Matthew Ridgway, the eighth Army commander in Korea, concluded that the primary purpose of an army—to be ready to fight effectively at all times—was forgotten. In the aftermath of the worst war in human history, American soldiers were as unprepared for the enemies that faced them in Korea as the French and British were for the Germans in 1940.

Today there is a growing concern in the halls of Congress that the U.S. Army is on this familiar path. Members worry because the Army’s senior leaders are conditioned to low-intensity conflict while America’s potential opponents in Russia and China are preparing for the Super Bowl. America’s potential opponents are reorganizing their ground forces to exploit new technologies within the operational framework of ISR-STRIKE.

New mobile armored battlegroups designed for high-intensity conventional warfare are emerging inside the Russian and Chinese Armies that mark a dramatic departure from the structure and thinking of their Cold War predecessors. The new fighting formations integrate loitering munitions or “Kamikaze Drones” with the precision strikes of devastating rocket artillery. Both weapon systems and warfighting concepts are finding their way into many foreign armies. All of these developments must be viewed in the context of integrated air defenses; systems that seriously degrade, even, cancel out American air supremacy.

The problem is that after years of service inside the U.S. military’s cutthroat bureaucracy, senior officers can recite the lessons of the past, but very few can grasp their future implications. Even fewer are prepared to alter the status quo to secure victory in the future.

Keep in mind that in a succession of Army chiefs of staff unveiled expensive new “transformation” programs purported to modernize the World War II/Cold War Army. They were hallucinations. The goal was to preserve as much of the old institutional status quo as possible by papering over deficiencies and maintaining existing career patterns. Meanwhile, senior officers hammered bits of new technology into the old organization for combat to create the illusion of change.

In The Innovator’s Dilemma, Clayton Christensen argued that private sector corporations must create specialized, autonomous organizations to exploit new technologies or risk squandering revolutionary capabilities inside status quo organizations. In view of the billions of dollars lost on failed Army modernization programs, Senators may want to consider establishing a special-purpose organization that is not subordinated to the Army hierarchy; a joint organization designed to field new, ground-combat formations for joint warfare.

The lessons are unmistakable: If you prepare for a sandlot pickup team and you go to the Super Bowl, you lose. And, equally important, armies cannot reform themselves.

Douglas Macgregor, is retired Army colonel, decorated combat veteran and the author of five books. His newest is, Margin of Victory, Naval Institute Press, 2016.

Image: Flickr

Saturday, January 27, 2018

GPI Held a Panel Discussion:

"New Security Concerns at the Turkey-Syria Border"

Will Washington and Ankara Agree to Resolve the New Crisis at the Turkey – Syria Border? 

America's announced and later modified plan to train and arm a Syrian border protection force composed of Syrian elements (Arabs and Kurds) has created new tensions between the U.S. and Turkey. It is clear that whatever the U.S. plans regarding the size and purpose of this mostly Syrian Kurdish force may be, a military force largely composed of the YPG is viewed by Ankara as a major security threat, since the YPG is openly affiliated with the PKK, an internationally recognized terror organization.

While Washington stated that it is aware of Turkey's strong concerns regarding the YPG and that they will be addressed to Turkey's satisfaction, Turkey is adamant in opposing what it calls a terror force to be deployed, with U.S. assistance, right across its southern border. A few days ago Ankara acted according to its stated intentions of neutralizing this threat by initiating a military attack against Kurds in North Western Syria. Will this military intervention escalate? Or will Washington and Ankara come to an understanding that will satisfy Ankara’s security concerns?  

In order to shed light on this new serious security crisis which further complicates an already fractured Middle Eastern scenario, the Global Policy Institute convened a panel of distinguished experts, Americans and Turkish, to discuss this potentially explosive matter.

The Panel included: Burak Kuntay, President of the American Studies Center at Bahcesehir University, Istanbul; Colonel Douglas Macgregor (ret), Military Analyst, and Executive VP, Burke-Macgregor Group LLC; Paolo von Schirach, President of the Global Policy Institute and Professor of International Affairs at BAU International University; Martin Sieff, Journalist, Global Affairs Fellow, Global Policy Institute and Professor, BAU International University. The Moderator was Cenk Karatas, Journalist, Global Affairs Fellow, Global Policy Institute.

The consensus among the panelists is that there is no clear, achievable U.S. strategic goal regarding Syria. The panelists also agreed that the mostly Kurdish “border force” announcement was ill-advised, since it is clear to all observers that Turkey will never accept a standing a mostly Syrian Kurdish military force, closely associated with the PKK, at its southern border. The panelists expressed the hope that President Trump may be able to de-escalate this dangerous crisis involving U.S. backed forces and Turkey, a NATO ally, through direct contacts with the Turkish Government.