Saturday, March 29, 2014

Macgregor: Pentagon satellite launch "monopoly" a security risk

Last Week, the Obama administration announced sanctions on top Russian and Ukrainian political figures. A day later, President Vladimir Putin defied the West and added Crimea to the Russian map.
How will current (and future) sanctions against Russia impact U.S. defense firms? 

Col. Douglas Macgregor, executive vice president of the Burke-Macgregor Group, offered his analysis on Government Matters.

Thursday, March 27, 2014

More Guns, Fewer Generals

The American Conservative, 27 March 2014 

excerpt: In fact there is an alternative plan currently gaining the attention of some on the Hill under which the Army can operate within the same top-line cap of 420,000 troops yet produce a force that has a great deal more combat power, is more strategically flexible, and—even under sequestration—can maintain 35,000 to 50,000 troops in a perpetual state of combat readiness...  According to our analysis, as a result of numerous formation and institutional reforms the [Macgregor Transformation Model] force of 420,000 may also cost $10 billion per year less than what the current force would cost at the same size. Thus, the MTM could produce an Army with almost double the armor, be sustainable even under sequestration, and save an additional $10 billion per year...

In the uncertain international security environment that exists today, it is of paramount importance that the United States ensure it has the most powerful Army possible within budgetary constraints. The Macgregor Transformation Model could be the vehicle that accomplishes that goal. What is needed before a decision can be made, however, is an unbiased analysis. The Government Accountability Office should examine the current proposal of the U.S. Army should it be forced down to 420,000 and compare it to the MTM at the same size. The stakes are too high to willingly choose an Army construct that is smaller and less capable when an alternative plan exists that would better ensure America’s vital national interests.

full report:

Monday, March 3, 2014

Stalin’s Successor is teaching.

Stalin’s Successor is teaching.
Americans should learn.
President Obama warns that if Russia intervenes with military power to crush the new Ukrainian government in Kiev there will be a cost.  Yet, it’s hard to know what the President can actually do that would impress Putin?
America’s post-Cold War surplus of military power is gone.  It was squandered on self-defeating occupations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The preoccupation with “irregular warfare,” the self-defeating interventions conflicts with insurgents that have no armies, no air forces, no air defenses and no naval strength has left the U.S. unprepared for current and future crises:
·       Shrinking the Army in favor of light infantry-centric counterinsurgency—focused units has turned what’s left of the Regular Army into a large constabulary force.  The failure to consolidate Army combat power through reorganization, to extract more fighting power from its remaining numbers has destroyed support for new, survivable combat platforms the Army needs.  Capability depends on organization, technology and leadership, not just numbers.
·       Inside the Navy, shrinking defense dollars are diverted into amphibious carriers and Service-unique jet aircraft for the Marine Corps at a point in time when slow, diesel-powered mini-aircraft carriers with minimal self-protection cannot operate in anything other than an extremely permissive environment.  The Department of the Navy cannot afford two independent air forces both operating variants of the same aircraft or different aircraft for overlapping missions.  
·       The Air Force and Navy need larger strike weapons that are faster; have more penetrating power and more lethality for potential conflicts with continental opponents like China or Russia, nation-states that can absorb the precision-guided missile strikes envisioned in Air-Sea Battle the way a sponge absorbs water.  
·       Today, the way American military power is organized and commanded obstructs unity of effort and supports wasteful spending.  The President and the Secretary of Defense do not actually command the U.S. Armed Forces, they referee them.  Because there is no national defense staff designed to assist the nation’s civilian leaders with the command and development of the armed forces, the American people depend on an ad hoc committee of Service Chiefs, Combatant Commanders, the Secretary of Defense and the President for collective military leadership.
Putin understands unity of command.  He has a national general staff and he commands the armed forces.  He also knows that only ready, trained Army forces equipped with mobile armored firepower integrated with powerful air forces can initiate decisive offensive operations, punch through enemy resistance, encircle and destroy enemy forces.  Secretary Hagel should know too, but he’s deferred to the Army four stars, men who treat the U.S. Army and its soldiers like an old tire; letting air out until money and people are provided to re-inflate it.  
But there comes a time when you cannot re-inflate the old tire, when the old tire must be replaced with something new and better.  It’s why Putin has subjected the Russian Army to sweeping reform and reorganization, eliminating its divisions and replacing them with large, mobile brigade groups commanded by generals; mobile armored formations designed for decisive operations in concert with Russian airpower.  
Russia is not as strong as it once was.  Russia’s armed forces number less than a million, down from 14 million in the 1980s, but like China, Russia is still a great continental power with massive air defenses and a powerful army.  
Fortunately, unlike Stalin between 1929 and 1932, Putin cannot murder millions of Ukrainians with impunity.  Public displays of Russian brutality might alert the American people to Russia’s true nature.  Worse, it might wake up Germany and the rest of the Europeans from their long, comfortable sleep.  These are the reasons why Putin is moving cautiously to secure control of Ukraine’s “Russified” East and Crimea,” before gradually pushing Russian military power West to Poland’s and NATO’s eastern border.
But it would help enormously if the U.S. Army could provide the United States and NATO with the capabilities they need; if the option of rapidly deploying integrated Joint U.S. Army and Aerospace forces to Central-East Europe existed.  It would be a game changer if the American people had an army capable of providing the core of an allied force around which the armies of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Germany could assemble.  Then, the President could hold Moscow’s aims in Ukraine hostage to Western political demands.  
Sadly, the option does not exist.  Putin knows it.  
Colonel (ret) Doug Macgregor is a decorated combat veteran, a PhD and the author of five books.  His last book was, Warrior’s Rage: The Great Tank Battle of 73 Easting, (USNI Press, 2009).