Wednesday, May 3, 2017

Can President Trump Cut a Deal for Peace on the Korean Peninsula?


President Trump needs a strategy that rejects the notion that an American military presence on Korean soil is essential.


Douglas Macgregor



Is there a diplomatic solution to the crisis on the Korean Peninsula? Yes, there is.

President Donald Trump should tell Chinese president Xi Jinping that the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula and the subsequent neutrality of a reunified Korean State are contingent on Beijing's support for a reunified Korean Peninsula under Seoul's control and leadership. Washington’s readiness to underwrite a reunified, but neutral, nonaligned Korean State reassures Beijing that the Korean Peninsula will not be used again as an invasion route into China.

Washington’s offer can succeed because it will incentivize the Chinese leadership to cooperate with Seoul, Washington and Tokyo. Rightly or wrongly, Beijing fears the American military presence on the Eurasian landmass and would welcome its departure. However, Beijing also knows that unless Seoul takes control of North Korea and its oppressed and starving masses, North Korea’s government will remain an economic burden and a permanent catalyst for unnecessary conflict with China’s neighbors and the United States.

President Trump discovered in his talks with President Xi that Beijing has no desire for war with the United States. China wants to do business with America, but if Washington strikes North Korea, Beijing’s readiness to cooperate in the resolution of the crisis will vanish. Worse, Beijing will conclude that its own security demands a much closer military relationship with Moscow—an arrangement that is, from China’s viewpoint, unnatural and undesirable. Clearly, Washington must avoid this outcome lest it obstruct future cooperation between the United States and China, the world’s two largest economies.

Now why has this idea not surfaced inside the Trump White House? Why would President Trump who currently demands that Seoul pay for the deployment of additional U.S. Forces to Korea not seek a way to secure Korean unity and freedom by disengaging U.S. Forces from the peninsula? After all, the Republic of Korea's economy is fifty times the size of North Korea’s. In economic terms, North Korea ranks behind Ethiopia, a sub-Saharan African State. Despite North Korea’s grossly exaggerated claims of military capability, North Korea is a dying state.

One of the reasons may be that President Trump’s advisors, like most people inside the Washington Beltway, oppose any change in the postwar status quo. Perhaps, they are privately committed to America’s unofficial, but very real overseas “empire” of military-economic dependencies? If so, they confuse a temporary military presence resulting from a stalemate brokered by President Eisenhower in 1953 with long-term American strategic interest.

During his 1952 election campaign, Eisenhower promised to go to Korea for a firsthand look at the situation on the ground. However, he made no promises regarding how he would end a deeply unpopular war that had killed more than thirty thousand Americans by 1953. When he came to the presidency, Eisenhower was determined to halt the growth of the federal government, balance the national budget and lower the rate of inflation, but the Korean Conflict put those priorities on hold.

Soon after arriving in Korea, President Eisenhower discovered that Gen. Mark Clark, the four-star commander of U.S. and allied forces in Korea wanted a large-scale frontal assault against the Chinese and Korean armies. He also wanted to conduct simultaneous air and sea operations against the Chinese mainland. Clark was convinced these operations would produce a stunning victory.

Eisenhower was not so sure. Eisenhower may have known that Moscow, not Beijing, approved the North Korean invasion of the South. But Eisenhower definitely knew how wasteful and self-defeating Japan’s 1937 invasion of China had been and how China’s determined resistance during World War II fatally weakened Japanese military strength.

Instead of widening the war as General Clark recommended, Eisenhower ended the conflict on the best terms he could get, insisting that Korean reunification would eventually be achieved with political—not military—means. In May 1953, 69 percent of Americans polled approved of Eisenhower’s actions, though, 55 percent still thought the war had not been worth fighting.

The world has changed since the Korean War. China and the United States are trading partners on a scale few imagined. Unlike Germany, Japan is ready to assert itself as an independent world power and play a key role in securing stability in Asia. Vietnam is no longer incurably hostile to the United States. But Americans are no less disinclined today to wage war in Asia than they were in 1953.

The point is simple. It’s time for President Trump to craft a new strategy, one that rejects the notion that an American military presence on Korean soil is essential to Washington’s global leadership. It’s not. Things have changed.

Col. (ret) Douglas Macgregor is a decorated Army combat veteran, a PhD and the author of five books. His newest is Margin of Victory: Five Battles that Changed the Face of Modern War, available from Naval Institute Press.

Image: EA-18 Growler at Kunsan Air Base, South Korea. Flickr/U.S. Department of Defense

Trump's 100 Day Report Card


Watch Macgregor on WJLA:  Your Voice, Your Future Roundtable: "100 Day Report Card".  You may need to turn off your ad blocker to view video.  Macgregor appears at the 20:00 minute mark.
http://wjla.com/news/nation-world/your-voice-your-future-roundtable-100-day-report-card


Friday, April 28, 2017

Book Review: Joint Force Quarterly 85 (2nd Quarter, April 2017)




Colonel John Dethlefs, USAR, is the Commander of the 209th Digital Liaison Detachment and a student at the U.S. Army War College.

 

Margin of Victory: Five Battles that Changed the Face of Modern War
By Douglas Macgregor

Naval Institute Press, 2016
288 pp. $34.95
ISBN: 978-1612519968

Reviewed by John Dethlefs

Douglas Macgregor’s newest book offers a tutorial and blueprint for the strategically guided development of the U.S. military. This is timely, as the Department of Defense finds itself preparing for our future national defense strategy, which in the Barack Obama administration was often referred to as the Third Offset. Planning for it should be nested within the current and anticipated strategic environment, emerging technologies, and how we intend to fight our next war. Macgregor analyzes the preparation for, execution of, and consequences of belligerence in five significant battles. He also includes a chapter with recommendations (some of which are quite controversial) for the U.S. military’s development.

In the opening chapter, the author recounts how Sir Richard Haldane, who was appointed the British Secretary of War in December 1905, reformed the British army despite its well-established naval supremacy and significant spending restraints. After analyzing the strategic environment, Haldane concluded he did not know precisely which power or alliance Britain would face in the next war. He asked first-order questions: Whom do we fight? Where do we fight? And how do we fight? The reforms were nested under the answers to these questions. The subsequent battle of Mons in 1914 would reveal that Haldane’s reforms served the British army well. The British Expeditionary Force proved to be strategically decisive in protecting France until the Allied powers, which eventually included U.S. forces, could defeat Germany.

Next, Macgregor details the Japanese rise to power and embrace of many Western ideas in the early 1900s. General Ugaki Kazushige “embodied the fight for change inside the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA),” as the Japanese struggled with reform and balancing resources between the navy and army. Much like Haldane, many of his reforms were resisted, blocked, or ignored by some military leadership. The subsequent battle of Shanghai in 1937 put these reforms to the test: “The disparity in Chinese and Japanese losses highlights the impact of Ugaki’s modest modernization efforts and the high quality of Japanese troops and leadership, but the struggle for control of Shanghai was harder and bloodier that it should have been. The IJA had failed to change enough to achieve a true margin of victory.” Herein lies a subtle warning to U.S. planners that they must be ruthless with our reform as we adjust to the new strategic environment and growing capabilities of possible adversaries.

The author next analyzes the modernization of the post–World War I Soviet and German forces and subsequent destruction of the German Army Group Center in June 1944 by Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. Macgregor argues the German defeat was decided well before any German forces entered the Soviet Union. The difference was ultimately how the Soviets and Germans approached military reform based on desired strategy.

Before the war, “the idea of waging total war to make Germany a world power was absent from German strategic thinking.” Macgregor goes on to explain Adolf Hitler’s demand that officers obey orders without dissent and his replacement of very capable officers with obedient technocrats. Their efforts in developing mechanized forces did not go far enough, as the Wehrmacht remained too reliant on horses and light infantry. The Soviets made many mistakes (including their own purges of capable officers), but weather and distance granted them the time to recover and regenerate their officer corps. The Soviets ultimately learned from their mistakes more quickly and developed more strategic agility wherein a Soviet marshal had more joint command authority than General Dwight D. Eisenhower did or our current combatant commanders can. The subsequent warfare rewarded operational agility, mobility, protection, and firepower—attributes Macgregor contends are even more important today.

In assessing the Yom Kippur war in the Sinai in 1973, the success of Egypt’s reforms after its defeat in 1969–1970, coupled with Israeli complacency, almost led to an overwhelming victory for Anwar Sadat. However, Israeli culture, leadership, training, technology, and adaptability eventually turned the tide. Considering this battle, Macgregor contends that recent ideas to convert the Israeli army largely into a light force of riflemen that depends on airstrikes for effectiveness is perilous. He highlights the enduring Israeli principle that diversity of capability is vital to success and implies it should be copied. He correctly points out that unless Egyptian and Arab society changes in fundamental ways, they are unlikely to acquire the capabilities required for success in war against modern forces such as those of Israel.

The last battle analyzed is one that Macgregor participated in personally. The Battle of 73 Easting during Operation Desert Storm is regularly cited as an overwhelming success. While Macgregor concurs with that assessment at the tactical level, he makes the argument that the campaign was a lost strategic opportunity for the United States. While successful, this battle did reveal flaws in our strategic thinking and execution. Macgregor contends that “although the twentieth century closed on a note of unrivaled American superiority in military affairs, the failure of policymakers and military leaders in Washington to define the purpose, method, and end state of military operations robbed the United States and its coalition partners of a decisive strategic victory.” He argues that U.S. aversion to risk allowed most of the Republican Guard to escape, ensuring Saddam Hussein would remain in power. From this, he claims that “the myth of the bloodless victory was born, and with it, the seductive promise of silver bullet technology that encourages arrogance and fosters illusions of victory with zero casualties was made.”

Macgregor concludes by looking at America’s “margin of victory” for the 21st century. He is quite critical of the current strategic direction. He correctly warns that “without effective strategic direction, battles such as 73 Easting can be won, but wars can still be lost.”

His more detailed recommendations are quite controversial. The first discusses the need for a change in U.S. national military strategy, contending that “the United States must act now to build the means of commanding its armed forces and impose unity of effort across service lines,” which he finds currently lacking. He writes expansively about ruthless reform focused on building joint integrated command structures at the operational level. This will improve American political and military leaders’ ability to comprehensively and decisively direct military power. Macgregor recommends that we have fewer command and control echelons, faster decision cycles, and more independence at lower levels, and that we become more mobile and dispersed. This is a direct challenge to the current “fighting by concept of operations,” in which four-star commands need approval for almost all actions in their own area of responsibility and lower echelons face even greater micromanagement.

Macgregor recommends changing the way we fight, stating that “full spectrum military dominance on a global basis is both unaffordable and unnecessary,” which directly challenges our past emphasis on building global security. This makes sense in the face of decreasing budgets and changes in the strategic environment. Other recommendations include reducing the number of light infantry forces due to the increase in lethality of modern weapons and replacing them with more armored combat formations requiring fewer—but more mobile, protected, and lethal—people. Hardening or expanding intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), communications, and space-based capabilities is important, as our potential adversaries arguably see disrupting these as the best method to gain parity with us.

Macgregor makes many profound recommendations based on significant historical evidence. This is a must-read for strategic leaders seeking ideas on military reform. In what I have read about future strategy and the defense innovation (including the Third Offset), few to none of Macgregor’s proposals are being considered. The focus is on technology improvements—mostly in regard to ISR and autonomous systems—and not the fundamental changes Macgregor champions. They deserve serious consideration. JFQ



Thursday, March 30, 2017

Book Review by Allen Boyer




Margin of Victory: Five Battles that Changed the Face of Modern War

Douglas Macgregor. Naval Institute Press, 2016. 268 pages. $34.95.
By Allen Boyer

This book is hammered together from two sermons and five cautionary tales, and it holds up marvelously. Author Douglas Macgregor, an Army tank officer who fought in Operation Desert Storm, touched off a fierce debate with his first book, Breaking the Phalanx (1997). Breaking the Phalanx was controversial because it called for slaughtering some of the Pentagon’s most sacred cows: closing regional military commands, scrapping the Navy’s carrier program, and buying attack helicopters rather than Air Force support planes. Margin of Victory is less controversial, but it can be just as provocative.

Following Clausewitz, Macgregor focuses on “wars of decision,” conflicts that change the shape of the political and economic world: “wars the United States cannot afford to lose.” He argues that we cannot predict against whom the United States will fight, or where, or when; we can bear in mind only that the next war of decision will inevitably occur; and we must concentrate on winning the first fight. Nor can we afford to wait, he warns: “Wars are decided in the decades before they begin, not by the sudden appearance of a new, technological ‘silver bullet’ or the presence of a few strong personalities in the senior ranks during a single battle.”

The first battle that Macgregor discusses, the British Expeditionary Force’s defense of Mons in 1914, is a study in flashback. Mons was a fighting retreat – very nearly a disaster. But the point of Mons, Macgregor finds, is that the British had a force that could stand up against German infantry and artillery. The British Army of Queen Victoria’s day fought tribal warriors and Boer militia. Its proud regiments were unprepared to fight a well-trained, well-equipped modern army. From 1905 to 1912, Sir Richard Haldane had struggled to build the B.E.F., an elite force of seven divisions (six infantry, one cavalry) that could deploy quickly against any foe in the world. At Mons, Haldane’s vision was vindicated; the B.E.F. held the French flank, preventing German victory.

The Battle of Shanghai, which raged for four months in the fall of 1937, was reckless and thoughtless – a bloody opening to a war for which neither side was ready. To gain control of Shanghai, Chiang Kai-shek put at risk his army. Even when surprise was lost, the Chinese futilely threw division after division into the attack, wasting units trained for years by German officers. The Japanese landed an army starved by years of financial cutbacks. They had tanks, artillery, and aircraft – but too few. The Japanese had “failed to change enough to achieve a true margin of victory,” Macgregor writes. Neither side could overwhelm the other. The Japanese pressed on into China, while the war grew increasingly bitter. The battle to control Shanghai ended with the destruction of Nanking.

The third battle, the Byelorussian campaign of 1944, features two armies that pursued different paths of reform. The Wehrmacht had developed the tactics of the blitzkrieg – calling down artillery and dive-bombers on enemy strongpoints, punching open the way for tanks and fast-moving infantry. However, German success with these new tactics concealed the weakness of German logistics; supplies for panzer divisions were pulled by draft horses. The Russians looked further ahead, to a concept of “deep battle” – broad strikes far into enemy territory, backed by up strategic reserves and immense supply chains. Russian resources, deployed by a unitary command  (“a Soviet marshal could [order] in minutes what took General Dwight D. Eisenhower months of negotiations with US and British air force commanders to do: unleash 700 long-range bombers”) won the day.

The shortest battle described in this book, between the United States Army and the Iraqi Republican Guard, is one in which Macgregor fought. On the afternoon of February 26, 1991, at a map gridline called 73 Easting, Cougar Squadron of the Second Armored Cavalry Regiment swept the desert clear of Iraqi forces, wrecking more than 70 tanks, 70 armored vehicles, 44 trucks, and 32 bunkers. This was the swift, devastating tank battle of which the Army had dreamed for fifty years – and yet it was not decisive. War planners called a halt to Operation Desert Storm, leaving Saddam Hussein in power.

Macgregor’s chapter on the Yom Kippur War of 1973 tells how two different armies each played to its own peculiar strength. Anwar Sadat, like Viscount Montgomery before Alamein, trained his soldiers exhaustively and massed artillery to support and protect them. He learned from Russian wartime experience in crossing rivers under fire. He sneaked five Egyptian divisions into trenches on the west bank of the Suez Canal, which was defended by only five Israeli battalions. When the Egyptians stormed across the canal, the defenders panicked – but when the Israelis regained their nerve, their daring brought the chance for a brilliant counterstrike, their own attack across the canal. The Israeli drive into Egypt could hardly be stopped, but the Egyptian beachhead in Sinai could not be dislodged. The two armies fought each other to a standstill, from which statesmen eventually forged a peace.

Margin of Victory is a meditation on military history. After his best divisions were ruined, Chiang Kai-shek, who had gambled on capturing Shanghai, became the wary, evasive, do-nothing despot whom General Stillwell despised. The fact that Chiang could shift strategy so radically underlines the unpredictability of war. Hitler’s generals and Stalin’s marshals both planned to fight sweeping tank battles, and they ultimately fought sweeping tank battles – ignoring casualties, since they answered to dictators, not voters. Because armies will fight the kind of wars they prepare for, this history suggests, the Army must choose carefully the kind of war it prepares for. However, Margin of Victory is also a soldier’s pamphlet. Captain H.R. McMaster, the young officer who commanded Eagle Troop of Cougar Squadron, the spearhead of the attack at 73 Easting, is now Lieutenant-General McMaster, the president’s National Security Adviser. A generation of soldiers have heard Macgregor’s preaching, and may share his faith.

Allen Boyer (ΦBK, Vanderbilt University, 1977) is a lawyer and writer in New York City.  His fifth book, “Rocky Boyer’s War: An Unvarnished History of the Air Blitz that Won the War in the Southwest Pacific,” will be published in May.  Vanderbilt University is home to the Alpha of Tennessee Chapter of Phi Beta Kappa.


Saturday, March 25, 2017

Video Link: All Arms Warfare in the 21st Century

Subcommittee: SUBCOMMITTEE ON AIRLAND  
Date: Wednesday, March 15, 2017  
Time: 03:30 PM  
Location: Room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building


 

Upcoming Event:


Pritzker Military Museum & Library and
Naval Institute Co-Sponsor Events in Chicago this Spring
 
  
The Pritzker Military Museum and Library, in co-sponsorship with the Naval Institute, will host three author events and one oral history event this spring in downtown Chicago. Visit the Pritzker's website for more details on these events.


Decorated combat veteran and author, Douglas Macgregor, PhD, will discuss his newest book Margin of Victory: Five Battles that Changed the Face of Modern War. The book details five military battles of note in the 20th century.

Win the close fight - Jerusalem Post newspaper