The US military is preparing for the wrong future

http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/08/us-military-preparing-for-wrong-future

When it comes to military reform, China appears to be doing it a lot better than the United States

US army 1LT Matthew Hernandez looks down the Korengal Valley from a mountaintop outpost 24 October 2008 in the Kunar Province of eastern Afghanistan. Photograph: John Moore/Getty Images

 

In the years after World War I, British military strategist Captain B H Liddell Hart advocated a new fighting concept that solved the problem of the static, set-piece nature of that conflict that resulted in the pointlessly slaughter of millions. He advocated for a force of coordinated armored, infantry, and air power fighting in mobile formations, operating under the "indirect method".

Unfortunately, key leaders in London and Paris rejected his theories because they had "won" the Great War and didn't feel the need to change. Less than two decades later, a combined British and French field army would be swept off the continent and into the English Channel in a lightning war by a German army that had listened to and incorporated some of Captain Liddell Hart's key concepts. Unless significant changes are made, the modern-day US army could be half-way to suffering a similar fate.

In an article published today by the Armed Forces Journal in Washington DC, I argue that the US army's generals, as a group, have lost the ability to effectively function at the high level required of those upon whom we place the responsibility for safeguarding our nation. Titled "Purge the Generals: What it will take to fix the army", the article details how our senior military leaders have amassed an unprecedented record of failure in major organizational, acquisition and strategic efforts over the past 20 years. 

The worst part is that senior leaders are likely to repeat the mistakes of the past by readying the US army for the wrong future; one in which the US could suffer an otherwise avoidable military defeat.

The global strategic situation has undergone considerable change in the past five years. Beginning in late 2007, the US economy suffered its most significant economic downturn since the Great Depression; recovery has been slow in coming and tepid since its arrival. With the conclusion of the eight year war in Iraq and the sun setting on the 12 year bleed in Afghanistan, the US is being forced to reduce both domestic and defense budgets. Whether anyone wants to scale back the armed forces or not, reductions are coming. The question, then, is how those cuts are to be made.

According to the 8 July edition of the Army Times, senior leaders have announced they will reduce the US army from the current level of approximately 535,000 down to 490,000. The unequivocal result: a smaller and less capable army. Many military leaders warn that these cuts will have a hollowing effect "putting our national security at risk", (pdf) as General Odierno told a Congressional panel in February 2013, and imply there are no other alternatives.

That is not correct. 

In 1997, then-lieutenant colonel Douglas A Macgregor published Breaking the Phalanx: a New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century describing a military transformation that would result in a smaller, less expensive force which would produce greater combat capability than the larger formations it would replace. Unfortunately, US officials rejected those new ideas, opting instead for incremental changes, which left the field army little changed from the version that won Desert Storm in 1991. One nation, however, did not reject Macgregor's ideas.

In 1999 two colonels from the Chinese people's liberation army (PLA) published a strategic analysis called Unrestricted Warfare. In this essay, they discussed the changing military environment and ways China could modernize its force for future war. Regarding force design and operating methods, they wrote: "In his book, 'Break the [Phalanx] (sic),' [Macgregor] advocated simultaneously abandoning the systems of divisions and brigades and replacing them with … battle groups of about 5,000 men each… [The book recommends the adoption of] building-block methods according to wartime needs and put into practice mission-style group organization." 

These views apparently heavily influenced PLA modernization theories, as one year later Breaking the Phalanx was translated into Chinese. A decade after that, the US army's Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) reported the PLA had incorporated many of Macgregor's concepts. In the SSI's 2011 study Chinese Lessons from Other People's Wars (pdf), the author noted 

The PLA entered the 21st century in the midst of a transformation from essentially an infantry based force into one designed around combined arms mech­anized operations. A decade into the new century, the PLA is redesigning its forces into battle groups, using modular force structures and logistics to sup­port operations in high altitude and complex terrains, conduct out of area operations, and develop the core for its vision of a hardened and network-centric army.

Macgregor has recently updated his concept to account for the past decade of US war experience. Whereas current army plans call for reducing the force to 490,000, the Macgregor Transformation Model (MTM) can produce an army with as few as 420,000 troops that actually has greater combat power than the force of 535,000 had before the reduction, but cost more than $10bn a year less. The MTM would also produce a more strategically responsive army, and perhaps most importantly, could be sustained at this high level of performance even in the era of constrained budgets. The US military leaders continue to reject MTM, while the Chinese have embraced it and are years into the transformation.

Before the United States shares a fate with 1940 Great Britain and falls victim to an ignored reformer's ideas, we must reorganize the US army into a stronger force while there is yet time. Logic affirms the reasonableness of such action. Budgets demand it.

• The opinions expressed here are those of the author alone and do not represent the views of the Department of Defense or the US Army.

Why Afghanistan Might Be the Marines’ Last Fight

www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2013/05/06/Why-Afghanistan-Might-Be-the-Marines-Last-Fight.aspx?goback=.gde_108279_member_242792251#page1      

Photo: REUTERS/Lucas Jackson

By DAVID FRANCIS, The Fiscal Times
May 6, 2013

 In 2010, then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates made waves when he ordered the Pentagon to take a hard look at the marines to determine what, if any role they would play in the future of warfare.

 “All of the military services have been challenged to find the right balance between preserving what is unique and valuable in their traditions, while at the same time making the changes necessary to win the wars we are in and prepare for the likely future threats in the years and decades to come,” he said. “Looking ahead, I do think it is proper to ask whether large-scale amphibious landings along the lines of Inchon [the marine’s invasion of the Korea peninsula in 1950] are feasible.” [EDITOR: It was Army General MacArthur's invasion and 7th Infantry Division troops did half the fighting and dying]

 The review, which was completed in 2011, recommended the marines shrink the size of their force dramatically and make other cuts that would lessen their strength. But the review did little to quiet speculation among the defense and policy community in Washington. There are lingering questions about the future of the marines, with some suggesting that their missions are better conducted by the Army, Navy and Special Forces.          

“They’re a service in search of mission,” said Gordon Adams, an American University professor and defense budget expert. 

Because of this lack of mission and ongoing budget pressures, the marines are becoming an endangered branch. In the age of DOD austerity, they represent low-hanging fruit that could easily be picked from the Pentagon’s tree. 

FATE IN THE HANDS OF THE NAVY 

The marines, while considered a separate branch of the military, are actually part of the Navy. They’re often referred to as the “infantry of the Navy.” 

“The marines don’t have a separate fiscal existence. They are a wholly owned subsidiary of the Navy,” Adams said. 

The marines are funded through two different mechanisms. For 2014, President Obama has proposed a marine operations and maintenance budget of $6.2 billion, slight increase from the $5.9 billion it received last year. This money is given directly to the marines. 

But the Navy has authority over the marine’s personnel budget–expected to be $12.9 billion in 2014. This means that Navy brass can decide how it pays to train, house, feed and maintain readiness of the troops. 

Because of this, according to Adams, the marines often find themselves the victims of Navy spending fights. At a time when DOD is facings years of spending cuts, funding for the marines is emerging as a bargaining chip in budgetary poker played among Navy commanders. 

“They’ve always had a struggle on the budgetary side in the Navy,” Adams said. “If acquisition is going south, it’s going to put the squeeze on the marines.” 

SMALL BUDGET BUT NO MISSION 

The marines’ small budget and relatively small force size might seem like an advantage. They are in the process of scaling down their forces from a peak of 202,100 to 182,100 by 2017 – a drawdown that was quietly announced last year.  Their $19.1 billion budget is also considered tiny compared to other Pentagon programs. 

In this case, small size and budget are working to the marines disadvantage. They’re not “too big to fail,” and their moribund mission is reflected in a force that hasn’t performed amphibious assaults for 73 years. 

This problem became acute during the Afghan war. The Army was conducting the majority of the ground offensives, and Special Forces were performing many of the high-risk missions once performed by marines. The other military branches were marginalizing them while illustrating just how outdated their core competency had become. 

Gates said as much when he referenced Inchon. In another speech in 2010, he said, “the marines do not want to be, nor does America need, another land army.  Nor do they want to be, nor does America need, a “U.S. Navy police force.” 
The future of warfare is unlikely to require amphibious assault capabilities. According to nearly every future threat assessment, the United States needs to focus on counterterrorism operations and cyber warfare, not for an invasion of China. 

Capitol Hill has taken notice. In 2011, it cancelled the $15 billion Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle program. It wasn’t just cost overruns that doomed the program – both the Pentagon and lawmakers have long shown the ability to tolerate wasteful programs.  Lawmakers and Pentagon planners determined that the vehicle was no longer needed.   

FRIENDS IN HIGH PLACES  
              
The marines are likely to survive not because their core competencies are vital to national security, but because they have allies on Capitol Hill who do not want to be responsible for killing a beloved service branch, says American’s Adams.

“I think the marines will survive because we can’t let go of anything,” he said. “They have a lot of friends on the Hill who want to say, ‘Semper Fi! We’re going to save the marines.” 

But Adams added, “It’s a dead mission. It’s an old mission,” referring to amphibious assault. “But it’s at the heart of the marines’ sense of self.”