Sunday, June 12, 2016

America Needs a Southern Border Wall Now: Colonel Macgregor Explains in Detail



Mexico certainly has problems.  The biggest problem confronting Mexico is not sinking oil revenues or any other purely economic issue. It is endemic, pervasive, and systemic CORRUPTION.

The answer is for the U.S. Government to do its job and take responsibility for controlling the US-Mexican border, sealing the border except at fully monitored, fully policed authorized border crossings, and implementing and publicizing a “use of deadly force authorized” border control policy.  A double-walled, concrete and concertina fence, overwatched with a mix of tower-mounted imaging sensors and unattended ground sensors for seismic/acoustic protection against undermining, and a gravelled patrol road between the dual walls policed by USBP and the U.S. Army, augmented by manned and unmanned aircraft, can and will seal the border.  Similar vigilance is needed by the USCG and local authorities along the coasts of the US and its harbors. Stretches of the U.S. border with Canada will need walls too.

Once it becomes clear that Central Americans AND Mexicans [and other illegals], are NOT going to survive an attempt to enter the US, and will be LUCKY if they are turned back rather than killed in the attempt to violate US sovereign borders, the flow will diminish substantially.  

As for Mexico’s southern border, if we control the northern border, they can move resources south, and they will have a much easier time with their more pressing internal security problem of American consumer-financed drug cartels corrupting and/or killing their police and military.  

Cheers, Doug 


'At the limit,' Mexico buckles under migrant surge to U.S.
June 10, 2016

By Gabriel Stargardter and Julia Edwards
TAPACHULA, Mexico/WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Mexico is struggling to stem the flow of Central American migrants traveling to the United States ahead of the U.S. presidential election, causing major concern in Washington, which is weighing sending more agents to help.
In 2014, Mexico moved to strengthen its southern border when a surge in child migrants from Central America sparked a political crisis in the United States.
Last year, Mexico detained over 190,000 migrants, more than double the number in 2012.
But official data examined by Reuters shows that fewer migrants have been captured in Mexico this year even as the number caught on the U.S. border has soared.
The slowdown in detentions on Mexican soil is frustrating U.S. officials who feel that Mexico could be doing more, according to a source familiar with internal briefings on the topic at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Illegal immigration is stoking a fierce debate ahead of the U.S. election on Nov. 8 with Republican candidate Donald Trump vowing to deport millions of people and build a wall along the Mexican border if elected president.
Mexico says its National Migration Institute (INM), which regulates migration in the country, is already working flat out to contain the problem, but it has a fraction of the resources that U.S. agencies have.
"We're at the limit of our resources," Humberto Roque Villanueva, Mexico's deputy interior minister responsible for migration, told Reuters.
The number of families stopped at the U.S.-Mexico border jumped 122 percent between October 2015 and April 2016 from the same period a year earlier, according to data from U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP).
The number of detained "unaccompanied minors" - children traveling without relatives - was 74 percent higher. Most of the Central Americans come from Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador.
Despite those increases, fewer migrants are being caught as they move through Mexico. Over the same period, Mexico detained and deported about 5 percent fewer people than in 2014/15. So far this year, 3.5 percent fewer unaccompanied minors have been stopped.
The DHS is considering sending more agents south to train Mexican officials on how to track human traffickers and stop migrants crossing the Mexico-Guatemala border, according to an internal briefing document obtained by Reuters.
U.S. Representative Henry Cuellar, who sits on the House Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee, said DHS officials told him they hope to help Mexico strengthen its southern border.
"When you're constantly working at full speed and don't have all the resources because your primary mission is to fight the drug cartels, yeah, you're going to be stretched," Cuellar said.
DHS spokesman Daniel Hetlage declined to say whether it aimed to send more officers to work with the INM, but said the DHS and CBP have an "excellent" relationship with the INM and Mexico's government.
Roque Villanueva attributed the migrant surge to people finding new routes past checkpoints. He said he was unaware of any U.S. plan to send reinforcements, and that there are already U.S. agents at Mexico's southern border, albeit only for training.
LEAKY BORDER
In 2014, Mexico launched the "Plan Frontera Sur" to tighten border controls, register migrants and stop them using the perilous network of trains known as "La Bestia", or "The Beast".
But migrants quickly adapted.
Elisabel Enriquez, Guatemala's vice-consul in Tapachula, said migrant smugglers now rent trucks and shuttling migrants from southern Mexico all the way to the U.S. border over 2,000 km away for up to $8,000 per person.
Two such trucks were stopped in recent weeks, she said, one stuffed with about 115 migrants and the other about 60.
Some migrants immediately apply for asylum on arrival in Mexico. Once granted a refugee visa, they can travel through Mexico without fear of being deported, said Irmgard Pund, who runs the local Belen migrant shelter.
So far this year, asylum applications with Mexican refugee agency COMAR are up over 150 percent compared with 2015, and could reach 10,000 by the end of the year, said Perrine Leclerc, head of the Tapachula field office for the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.
The rise in families heading north is partly due to a 2015 U.S federal court decision limiting the time mothers and children can be held in detention, which has created the mistaken impression they can stay in the United States, U.S. officials say.
A regional drought in Central America has also increased pressure to leave, while some migrants are trying to cross ahead of the election in case Trump wins and follows through on his campaign promises, making it more difficult for them in the future.
Compared to their U.S. counterparts, Mexico's migration authorities get by on a shoestring. The INM spent 4.14 billion pesos ($228.37 million) in 2015, less than 2 percent of the CBP's budget request for 2016.
The United States has tripled its border force under President Barack Obama to 60,000 staff, while the INM has 5,383 employees.
Roque Villanueva said the fall in the price of oil, which funds about a fifth of Mexico's federal budget, makes it even harder to put new resources into the INM.
Nonetheless, he said Mexico and the United States would continue to work closely together as Washington has plenty of reasons for wanting a robust southern Mexican border.
"The Americans are not so worried by how many Central Americans get through, but rather about making sure nobody with even the slightest chance of being a terrorist does," he said.
($1 = 18.1287 pesos)
(Writing by Gabriel Stargardter; Editing by Kieran Murray and Ross Colvin)

Col. Douglas Macgregor on U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy for the Next President


http://www.michaeldostrolenk.com/col-douglas-macgregor-on-u-s-foreign-and-defense-policy-for-the-next-president-oradio/


Ostrolenk speaks with Col. Douglas Macgregor on the U.S. Foreign Policy and Defense advice he would offer to the next President. Col. Macgregor gives an overview of the strategic objectives of Russia and China and how neither is the imminent threat we may believe them to be. Col. Mcgregor also presents that many countries can afford to protect themselves and that America should explore where it makes sense to remove ground troops. Finally, he would advise the future President that not every military action in the Middle East is directed at the U.S.; while the United States can protect its own borders from ISIS, the U.S. will not be able to defeat ISIS abroad. With these considerations and many other examples detailed, Col. Macgregor ultimately stresses that the United States cannot, and should not, be everywhere: global military hegemony is unaffordable, but regional military dominance when needed, is obtainable.

To learn more about Col. Macgregor, you can follow him on Twitter and check out his newest book: Margin of Victory.


Monday, June 6, 2016

Customer Review of Margin of Victory on Amazon





Top Customer Reviews




Eric M Walters on June 2, 2016

Format: Kindle Edition 

An engaging and compelling tour de force, Douglas Macgregor's MARGIN OF VICTORY: FIVE BATTLES THAT CHANGED THE FACE OF MODERN WAR knits together narratives of lesser- known 20th Century battles to generate observations relevant to America's 21st Century strategic defense challenges. Macgregor puts his main emphasis on the national military analyses, decisions, and preparations of the eventual victor, made well before these battles were fought. His accounts of combat actions effectively illustrate how critical these were to create conditions leading to success in the field. Whether the margins of victory were narrow (such as the British Expeditionary Force—despite retreating from Mons and Le Cateau--throwing grit in the Schlieffen Plan’s gears in France, 1914), or wide (illustrated by the Soviets crushing an entire German army group in a matter of weeks in 1944), institutional foresight and preparation was key.

There are other books that examine this but typically examine failure to learn the right lessons after a war. Still other works focus narrowly on technical innovations in weaponry, organization, and/or tactical concepts resulting from lessons learned.

What is different about MARGIN OF VICTORY is its focus on how some institutions did not extrapolate contemporary trends to characterize future national security environments, but came up with new kinds of forecasts breaking with conventional wisdom. Indeed, these militaries were able to envision far more accurately what types of conflicts they would be fighting in the future, rather than merely mirror the kinds of wars they had fought in the recent past. Macgregor’s case studies are intended as exceptions to the well-worn notion that nations always prepare for the next war or campaign as if they were fighting the last one.

While military history buffs will appreciate the author's perspective as an accomplished combat leader in describing these battles in the first five chapters, this book is meant to inform senior defense policymakers, military officers, and defense reform advocates who are seriously concerned about American national military strategy. Macgregor enjoys a well-established track record for creative thinking, conditioned by a soldier’s sense; he does not disappoint in his concluding chapter, spelling out what needs to be done to prepare the United States for the next war.

This is a timely book as the U.S. Defense Department grapples with the dilemma of configuring the military to fight wars of choice against much less capable adversaries (Iraq and Afghanistan), or prioritizing development to win against near-peer competitors if (or when) war is forced upon the United States.

Macgregor has fired a heavy salvo in the ongoing debate on the future size, shape, organization, and characteristics of the U.S. military. Those with an interest in how history should or should not influence national strategy formulation or who are simply curious about alternative views on defense reform will find MARGIN OF VICTORY a provocative and satisfying read.